

**NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CAUSE AND
CURE OF WAR**

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
Rec'd in NY of 1st class Jan 20, 1935 p. 5
C. S. Monitor Jan 26, 1935 p. 16

WHY WARS MUST CEASE

By

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NEW YORK
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1935

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for the
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE
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Set up and printed.
Published January, 1935.

TO
THE YOUTH OF TODAY

661723

"Once more I beg you all to tear away the veil of sentimental mysticism through which you have looked at war, and try to see it as it really is. The words which you have associated with it for so many years: "victory" "defeat" "indemnities" "non-combatants"; these words have now lost their meaning; just as the word "War" has lost its meaning. It is no longer War. It is something for which the word has not yet been invented, something as far removed from the Napoleonic Wars as they were from a boxing match. This new thing which you are asked to renounce is a degradation which would soil the beasts, a lunacy which would shame the madhouse. In renouncing it, you will be renouncing nothing which History has accepted or Poetry idealized, nothing in which your countries have found profit or your countrymen glory."

PEACE WITH HONOR. A. A. Milne, page 214.

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FOREWORD

TEN years ago a few of the more important women's national organizations in the United States united in a National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. None of the organizations was a peace society and only one had a functioning peace department. By way of experiment a conference was held to which many of the best informed men of this and other nations were invited to explain the causes of continuous wars and the possible cure for this ruinous custom.

Now ten conferences have been held in as many years. Delegates have attended from every state. Regional, state, and local conferences have been held and the findings of the national conference have been passed on to these local groups. A Reading Course was early established to confirm facts set forth at the conference and to aid in the further investigation into the cause and cure of war. The national organizations in this Committee number eleven; the membership is numbered in the millions. Each organization now has a department on international relations, although without uniform title. Programs upon various phases of the cause and cure of war have been heard in many national and state conventions and

many local clubs or societies make a frequent feature of such programs. The investigation into the causes and the possible cures of war has been sincere and earnest.

In the first national conference it was reported that two hundred and fifty-seven reasons had been actually recorded in history as the causes of past wars. The National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, however, after ten years of research, finds that the real cause of modern wars is the maintenance of the organized war system with its competition in armaments, strategy, and prestige and that the only possible cure of war is its complete abolition. War can be and will be abolished only when the nations of the world want peace instead of war.

Believing that the nations have not faced squarely the Facts of War, believing that these facts cannot be too often reiterated, the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, on this tenth anniversary of its existence, issues this book, **WHY WARS MUST CEASE.**

Nothing so vast as the World War can be reduced to terms of unchallengeable figures and probably no figures are more unreliable than the usual war statistics. But the Chief Powers engaged in the World War made a firm resolution to know definitely the number of fighting men, the number of dead, wounded and missing, and the cost in money of the

War so far as they themselves were concerned. In the result, authorities differ somewhat, but when they do it is because the bases of estimate differ, or because the periods which the estimates cover are different. In drawing from them, the writers of this book believe that every figure quoted is as nearly correct as it is humanly possible to make it.

THE BOOK COMMITTEE.

WHY WARS MUST CEASE

	FOREWORD	PAGE ix
CHAPTER		
I.	"BECAUSE IF WE DO NOT DESTROY WAR NOW, WAR WILL DESTROY US" . . . CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT	I
II.	BECAUSE THE WAR IDEA IS OBSOLETE . . . MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT	20
III.	BECAUSE WARS WASTE HUMAN LIFE . . . MARY E. WOOLLEY	30
IV.	BECAUSE WARS COST TOO MUCH . . . MRS. WILLIAM BROWN MELONEY	43
V.	BECAUSE WARS PRODUCE ECONOMIC CHAOS FLORENCE BREWER BOECKEL	63
VI.	BECAUSE IN WAR YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT YOU ARE FIGHTING FOR . . . EMILY NEWELL BLAIR	82
VII.	BECAUSE WARS UNLEASH DEMORALIZING INSTINCTS JUDGE FLORENCE E. ALLEN	99
VIII.	BECAUSE WAR BREEDS WAR DR. ALICE HAMILTON	119

xiv WHY WARS MUST CEASE

CHAPTER	PAGE
IX. BECAUSE WARS INTERFERE WITH THE NORMAL GROWTH OF CIVILIZATION JANE ADDAMS	129
X. IN CONCLUSION DOROTHY CANFIELD FISHER	140

WHY WARS MUST CEASE

CHAPTER I

"BECAUSE IF WE DO NOT DESTROY WAR NOW, WAR WILL DESTROY US"

CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT

"If my soldiers would really think, not one would remain in the ranks."

FREDERICK THE GREAT.

THE world is again talking of war. When it will begin and what nations will start it are predicted. It must be admitted that so long as every Great Power, including the United States, continually expands its preparation for war and does so to the point that suspicion of its motives is amply justified by all other nations, it follows that there is no guarantee that any peace agreement, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, or the Paris Pact, will prevent another war. While nations spend approximately 85c out of every dollar of annual income upon preparedness for war, and take a spineless, hesitating, uncertain attitude toward preparation for peace, competition in armament will proceed, hindered only by empty war chests and scant credit.

Since the League of Nations, the Paris Pact, and

the Naval Conference Treaties did not prevent the military seizure of Manchukuo, nor stop the frontier war between Bolivia and Paraguay, nor carry out in the Disarmament Conference the pledge made by the Allied nations to reduce their armies and armament down to the level they had fixed for the Central Powers in the Treaty of Versailles, governments and peoples are naturally apprehensive that the obvious signs and symptoms of another war are revealing themselves in the usual way.

The average citizen hopes there will be no war. Other generations have fostered the same hope without avail. The average citizen may also hold that the correct attitude toward the possible oncoming of war is non-recognition of the signs. In other times people have held these views too, but war rolled on and possibly it came because no protest had been made in time to have an effect.

There is one thing no people have ever done; that is, to oppose a threatening war with intelligent and vigorous purpose some years before it was due to arrive. The citizens of all nations who do not want the threatened "Next War" to come should oppose it *NOW*.

The writers of this book bring an indictment against war, all war. They pronounce the war system utterly false in theory, brutally barbarous in operation, and a demoralizing handicap to the normal development of the human race. Whatever may be said concerning war as a factor of evolution in

earlier times, it is now certain that no benefit will accrue to any nation involved in war hereafter that will equal the calamitous price paid for it. Should two nations enter another war equally equipped with men and destructive weapons, the combat would merely mean "a tragedy of mutual extermination." Should one nation possess fewer men than its opponent, or inferior killing weapons, war means defeat for that nation with enormous casualties. Every nation is striving to avoid this possibility by making its own preparation for war superior to that of any other nation. Should the threatened "Next War" come well supplied with weapons of the last war or with the predicted improvement of those weapons, the result will be the most titanic disaster within the experience of the human race. With universal dread of a "Next War" mounting higher and higher, day after day, there is obvious need to call a mobilization of the common sense of the nations, not only to prevent the "Next War," but to bring the entire war system to a definite end.

Can that be done? Certainly. The human race can abolish whatever it wants abolished. It has changed its mind about other damaging institutions and put them out of existence. It will do it again when it sees the necessity. How? By compelling the governments and peoples of the world to face fairly and squarely the savage, bloody, disillusioning, de-civilizing Facts of War. It is by this process that all changes in our civilization have taken place.

The facts of war appall. Archeologists have been digging into the buried secrets of ancient peoples with especial zeal since the Great War and have unearthed old battlefields all around the world. The Marne, it appears, has been a field of combat since earliest times. Below late battlefields, others have been found, and beneath these, still others. Here, twenty thousand years ago, cave men fought other cave men, and fourteen hundred years ago, the Romans and Visigoths gave Attila his greatest defeat.

These scientists tell us, also, that three thousand years before the coming of the Prince of Peace men made war weapons of metal, chiefly bronze, and that after the manufacture of each new type of weapon, wars became more deadly and pernicious. Wars did not decrease after the advent of the Christian era. Instead, they grew more terrible, each more bloody and destructive than the previous one.

The most startling fact about the World War is that it was a Christian war. Christian nations began it, Christian nations led on both sides and kept it going until the bitter end. Moreover, before the war, Christian nations had unified the war system until it controlled the whole world and made the World War inevitable.

In 1914 every nation, large and small, every province, colony, and tribe, had its war machine as well organized and as efficient as its war chest permitted.

The kind of imperialism that for centuries had led nations to increase their empires by the seizure

of new territories, had virtually come to an end by August, 1914. There remained little, if any, territory by that date that had not already been coerced under a white nation's overlordship. "More than half of the world's land surface and more than a billion human beings are included in the colonies and backward countries dominated by a few imperialistic nations. Every man, woman, and child in Great Britain has ten colonial subjects, black, brown, yellow. For every acre in France, there are twenty in the French colonies and protectorates." ¹ The rifle had replaced the bow and arrow and throwing stick in the hands of these backward peoples and when they came to Europe for the World War they were familiar with the white man's methods and weapons. The war system was thus unified the world around. All human beings were embraced in it. No nation, no tribe, no man, could escape it. Conscription or the draft, developed in the previous half-century, could seize and compel a man to fight another man, also conscripted, neither knowing why there was a war.

"So in Europe in 1914," wrote Sir Philip Gibbs, "Indian princes sent their cavalry. Colored men came in battalions from the West Indies. East African Negroes, under white officers, fought in the jungle against Germans, also commanding black troops. Chinese came to build roads. No race was absent." So sensitive was the war trigger that any nation, tribe, or even a single individual, could have started a war at an hour's notice, though no human

power, however great, could stop it when once it had begun. War was regarded as a respected policy among nations, an institution of honorable status in all constitutions and parliaments. Alliances between nations had divided the Continent of Europe into two camps, each armed, trained, and ready. Had not the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife been assassinated at Sarajevo, another cause for a great war would certainly have been found.

The War System, for the first time since its inclusion of every tribe and nation, demonstrated its ability to mobilize the most colossal army the world had yet known. According to Gibbon, the Roman Army, under Cæsar, guarding a mighty empire, extending from the Euphrates to the Thames, did not exceed 400,000 men. The army of Napoleon," terrifying all Europe and part of Africa, did not exceed 700,000 men. It is said that had all the able-bodied men, young and old, been enlisted in the armies of Great Britain and America, at the time of the Revolution, the total would not have exceeded 4,000,000 men. The population of the United States having vastly increased meanwhile, the armies of the North and the South, in the four years Civil War, approximated 4,000,000 men. The British sent a great army to South Africa in the Boer War, but it did not exceed 300,000 men.

In comparison, note that the official record reports that in the World War 33 million men were engaged

on the side of the Allies and 20 million on the side of the Central Powers, or 53 million men as a total. Had all the men in the entire world, 360 million," been gathered in one spot, one in every seven men would have marched away to produce that 53 million.

"The United States enlisted 4,800,000 men and sent 2,000,000 to France. In July, 1918, 10,000 men were being sent over daily and 306,000 were sent during that month,—four times as many men as there were on both sides of the battles of Waterloo or Gettysburg." " That these young Americans were not yearning for war is indicated by official reports that many thousands of drafted men had never fired a rifle.

Doubtless from the beginning of war, tribes and peoples had continually striven to invent and produce weapons of higher destructive power than those of their enemies, but after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, this competition grew more hectic and determined. When the armies gathered for the World War therefore, they came with rifles lighter in weight, quicker in action, and more easily loaded than those of any previous war. "The majority of Continental troops in the Revolution were armed with muskets, model of 1763, purchased from the French. This was a smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, flint-lock weapon, firing a spherical lead ball weighing about 440 grams." " For each shot, a soldier poured powder into the gun barrel from his powder horn carried over his shoulder, added a ball wrapped

in a greased rag and rammed all into place with a ramrod. He then poured powder into the flash pan to fire the gun by contact with the flint. In the World War, the rifles carried were supplied with cartridges, some of them streamlined in shape, five to ten loaded at once and exploded by different contrivances. A scientific gun-maker should be able to estimate with accuracy how much greater killing power the World War soldiers had than their ancestors of 1776 and also how much greater were their own chances of being killed. When cannon were invented (after the European introduction of gun-powder about 1240) the first projectiles were stones fired from a barrel with the aid of powder. From that date cannon and guns have been constantly improved and in the Great War several new varieties were used, all carrying heavier projectiles and propelling them farther and faster than those of previous date. Germany astounded her enemies by the use of the "Big Bertha," the largest gun yet produced. Machine guns before the World War were provided with a fixed mounting, but in the World War light and portable machine guns that could be carried by one man were used. Automatic and terrible, with a capacity of 450 to 500 shots per minute, they were far more destructive of life than any gun yet used, despite the fact that their weight of 17 to 28 pounds per gun limited their use.

Submarines were invented nearly a hundred years before the World War, but they had not been suc-

cessfully employed in any previous combat. No nation, unless it was Germany, anticipated that they would be an important factor in the World War; and yet "fifty-seven German submarines sank 8,500,000 tons of British shipping. During the war, 5,408 ships were sunk, totaling 11,189,000 gross tons, and 203 submarines were destroyed." * All the chief powers produced submarines before the war closed. Airplanes were new and at first regarded as too imperfect to prove a significant factor among the fighting equipment, yet, before the war had gone far, they were probably the most dreaded of all forms of destruction. "As many as 300,000 persons found refuge in the underground railway tube in London in a single attack. 1,413 persons were killed in British raids and 3,407 were injured. A night attack stopped work at munition plants in a wide area and some two hundred planes and well-trained pilots, about to be sent to the Continent, were kept at home for defense. Much property was destroyed." * These were probably satisfactory results from the German point of view.

Tanks, a wholly new instrument of war, were introduced by Great Britain. The Germans captured one and imitated it. Soon every nation had them. Submarine chasers, anti-aircraft guns, and gas masks, countering equipment, were hastily invented and used by all the armies.

Poison gas was not newly invented, but it had not been employed as a war weapon before. At the

first Hague Tribunal a convention was adopted prohibiting the use of poison gas and airplanes in time of war. Yet poison gas and airplanes, introduced by the Germans, were adopted as soon as possible by all the chief participating States. "Gas casualties in the French army were estimated at 190,000; those in the British army, 180,000; those in the American army, 70,552 or 27% of all our casualties."

"When all was over," wrote Winston Churchill, "torture and cannibalism were the only two expedients that the civilized, scientific, Christian states had been able to deny themselves; and these were of doubtful utility."

One of the first tasks that the League of Nations set itself was to ascertain the cost of the World War. It officially announced that cost to have been nearly \$187,000,000,000 or \$93.50 for every man, woman and child in the entire world. This was the first time that the cost of a war had been officially determined and publicly announced. The Geneva statesmen further calculated the cost of the World War to have exceeded that of all wars added together since the beginning of *the Christian era*. But the cost of the World War, as thus estimated, applied only to the opening of the war, the period of combat, and the return of the armies to their home lands. General Tasker Howard Bliss estimated that the War "cost the nations concerned a total of \$337,946,176,657." * James M. Beck, in his "War and Humanity," printed in 1917, announced that this entire country and its

wealth was worth \$250,000,000,000. If these two men were right, approximately, in their estimates, then the War cost more than the entire worth of the United States. In later estimates figures for the cost of the actual warfare period mount much higher. And war costs did not end with the warfare period and the return of armies to their home lands. In our own country there has been interest to be paid on Liberty bonds, pensions to soldiers, hospital care for wounded, gassed, and disabled, and billions of dollars for the relief of millions of men and women unable to secure work or robbed of income by the universal post-war business depression which settled upon every nation. (See Chapter IV, by Mrs. Brown Meloney and Chapter V by Mrs. Florence Brewer Boeckel.)

An army so gigantic, equipped with weapons more destructive than any previous army had had, left behind it an astounding number of dead. Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, chief of the British General Staff during the World War, is sponsor for the statement that the dead in the Great War numbered 10,873,000. General Tasker Howard Bliss gives the total death list as 12,991,000.¹⁰ The number of those killed in all wars of the preceding one hundred and twenty years (1790-1913) has been estimated at 4,449,300.¹¹ Accepting the figures of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, the total killed in the World War was very nearly three times as many as those killed in all wars of the previous

one hundred and twenty years. Field Marshal Robertson adds that if the victims of army and navy blockades, of revolutions, of sunken and shipwrecked boats, of bombardments, be added to this list, the number of dead would amount to 37,000,000, others raise the total still higher. (See Chapter III, by Dr. Mary E. Woolley.)

A financial and business impotence, called a depression, follows every war. The World War included more nations, cost more money, and enlisted more men, than any other in the world's history. Naturally, it was followed by the most extensive, disastrous, and stubborn depression within the knowledge of men. A war depression is often a severer shock to a nation than the war itself. Many great men have declared that civilization cannot survive another world war; it is even more doubtful if it could withstand another depression. (See Chapter V, by Mrs. Florence Brewer Boeckel.)

The great armies, the deadly weapons, the huge cost, the grim lists of dead and disabled, the distresses of the after-war depression, are all inevitable penalties of war, but these do not comprise the entire price a nation pays for its indulgence. Wars invariably arouse savage instincts and lower the standard of morality, toleration, and decency. The evidence is manifest in conversations, in good and in cheap literature, at movies, and at theatres. Wars are followed by a costly increase of crime which becomes noticeably more cruel and brutal. There is

also a heavy increase of juvenile misdemeanors and crime due to the excitements of war. Astounding dishonesty in high places, extravagances and wild speculation are also symptoms of after-war effects. Lowered vitality, due to food conditions, combined with overwork and overstrain, sorrow and worry, increases insanity, sickness, and death among civilians. All agencies designed to aid the poor, dependents, subnormals, or afflicted, are more or less incapacitated after war. In brief, the entire population of a warring nation is demoralized and relapses into conditions supposedly long past. Yet the most shocking of war effects is the fact that the pride, hate, suspicion, greed, or disputes which produced the war just past are still existent and ready to stir the people to another trial by force. (See Chapter VI, by Mrs. Emily Newell Blair; Chapter VII, by Judge Florence E. Allen; Chapter IX, by Jane Addams.)

When and if a "Next War" comes, all authorities appear to agree that it will be more hideous than the last. They further agree that no weapon or equipment used in the last war will be abandoned in the next because it was too ruthless. On the contrary, every nation, if it can, will have improved each instrument of war by making it more powerfully destructive. More, if possible, it will invent and produce new weapons that will be more deadly than any yet used. The possible new weapons that may appear with the coming of the threatening "Next War" are the dread of all nations.

Efforts are certainly being made in some gun factories, and perhaps in all, to prevent the flash of explosion and to create more perfectly smokeless powder, because the flash may reveal the position of the firer of the gun to the enemy at night and the smoke may reveal it by day. Steadfast endeavor to produce a noiseless gun explosion is also a part of the hoped-for improvements before the next war. When a rifle can be fired without noise, smoke or flash, it will be more deadly than those now in use, but it will also follow that every army must be equipped anew with rifles or ammunition, which will mean a fine profit to the munitions factories and a new burden to the taxpayers.

Already several nations have announced that they now have a gas more poisonous than any used in the last war. The United States of America told the world, in the closing months of the war, that it had discovered Lewisite, a gas more destructive than any yet used, but had refrained from producing it. Now, however, it has outdone itself by announcing two new poison gases, each more destructive than Lewisite.

All the chief powers have advertised the fact that they now have a larger "Big Bertha" than the Germans had. The United States describes its new gun, planned by its Army ordnance experts, as "the heaviest and most powerful gun of its type in the entire world." It has been officially stated in the press that it is capable of hurling an armor-piercing projectile

of 1,560 pounds for a distance of twenty-three miles. Larger submarines, also, have been constructed, much improved in mysterious ways and made capable of projecting larger, heavier torpedoes than any used in the last war.

A brisk competitive race in the building of airplanes has been in progress. Many military authorities have declared that the next war will be fought in the skies. At the close of the Great War no nation possessed airplanes in excess of one hundred. At the close of the year 1931, an official statement of the number and character of airplanes then possessed by each state was made by the League of Nations. At that date, France had 2,375, Great Britain 1,434, Italy 1,507, Japan 1,639, the United States 1,752, the total of these five nations being 8,707. Since that date, the race for quantity, size, and quality has continued, but nations refrain from frank confession as to their present air equipment. The correct number owned by each nation is also difficult to ascertain because airplanes have been accidentally destroyed, purposely abandoned for better designs, and many new types have been built without known value.

At a hearing of the President's Aviation Commission (October 19, 1934, Washington) a designer of airplanes announced that airplanes carrying two hundred pound bombs, one hundred to a plane; and seaplanes with a range of 4,600 miles, carrying fifty-six passengers and one hundred pounds of cargo, were

well on their way to perfection. Imagine a fleet of airplanes hovering over New York, loaded with bombs, some filled with the new varieties of poison gas, incurable disease germs or explosives to set our skyscrapers on fire, while in defense the promised "death rays" are blinding or killing the pilots, thus leaving no control of the airplanes which, in nose dives, will speedily spill out the precious bombs, germs, poison, and fire setters over our greatest city! Once, it is claimed, God sent a flood and destroyed most of the human race because it had been such a failure. This picture of war in the skies, actually painted by those who believe the prediction well founded, calls loudly for another fresh start for the human race.

There probably has been more talk about the competition of naval building of a few Great Powers than any other phase of war preparation. The largest expense of preparedness for these nations is the construction of new warships and the maintenance of the navy.

It is clear that the number of men engaged in war has increased out of proportion to the increase in population, that weapons have grown more destructive and war has become more complicated. It now includes not only all the men of the world, but there is a threat to conscript all women in the chief nations when and if there is another war. Certainly, if one country conscripts women, other nations engaged in the same war will also do so, for that is the

usual war policy. Apparently, the Powers That Be propose to add a competition in the use of women for war purposes to the competition in armament which, for many years, has lain at the foundation of preparedness for war. Women need expect no protection as non-combatants in another war. More, the new weapons of airplane bombs, poison gas, and disease germs, which may or may not be so deadly as some authorities think, will threaten the lives of women and children in every warring nation. Grown desperate enough, any country might logically agree with General Ludendorf and carry out his theory. He said: "All the means to weaken an enemy nation become legitimate. By killing women and children, for example, one destroys future mothers and eventual defenders of the country." This is correct philosophy if war is to be continued. In the World War there arose such a desperate demand for more men at the front that women were urged for patriotic and war reasons to supply in larger numbers the posts made vacant by the enlistment of soldiers. Five millions of women slipped into men's places in Great Britain, eight hundred thousand being employed in munitions. In the United States, one million five hundred thousand women were engaged in war industries, one hundred thousand of them in munition plants and forty-five thousand were clerical workers in the war departments in Washington alone. Women in the Central Powers, even those of Turkey, were employed in the same character of work, but

figures of the number engaged are not available. Lord Balfour said in this country in 1917, "Behind every man in the trench, there are ten persons making it possible for him to stay there, and at present seven of the ten persons are women." General Joffre said: "We have two armies, one in the trench, and one behind the trenches. The one in the rear is composed largely of women." So wrote General Tasker H. Bliss: "A nation in arms is a nation of combatants, men, women, and children—some drafted to the front, the labor of others commandeered and directed to maintain the former."

Women would now do well to transform their traditional habit of helpless surrender when war comes to one of righteous opposition to war itself while it merely threatens. War does not creep upon a nation as did smallpox before vaccination. It comes because the people of the nation have no freedom to express their opinion or because they are too ignorant to know the history of war or the facts that keep it going. I urge you, women, to know more, think more, do more, about this world's war system.

Men and women will do well to march together toward the abolition of war. It will require all the bravery, information, and understanding the people of this and other nations can muster to bring this mighty and terrible institution to its close. Let me repeat, the progress of the human race demands the speedy abolition of war.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Dr. Parker Thomas Moon, "Imperialism and Politics."

² Beck, "Evidence of the Case."

³ One-fifth of 1,800 millions, the estimated world population in 1914, is 360 millions.

⁴ Frederick Palmer in the *New York Times*, July 29, 1934.

⁵ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Volume XX, page 804.

⁶ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Volume XXI, page 499.

⁷ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Volume I, page 461.

⁸ "The Air Menace and the Answer," page 25.

⁹ "What Really Happened at Paris," page 385.

¹⁰ "What Really Happened at Paris," page 385.

¹¹ "What Really Happened at Paris," page 384.

CHAPTER II

BECAUSE THE WAR IDEA IS OBSOLETE

MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"My first wish is to see this plague of mankind (war) banished from the earth."

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Is the war idea obsolete?

I have asked many, many people if they thought that war itself was actually obsolete, and a great many have agreed that war should be obsolete, but invariably they insist that, for one reason or another, the continuation of war in the world is probably inevitable.

What I want to prove to you is that the war idea is obsolete, but that we haven't as yet recognized it. The day that the majority of people throughout the world recognize this truth, that day war itself will be obsolete.

We had a period in our own history which illustrates what I mean when I say that an idea may be obsolete, but that until the fact that it is obsolete is recognized it continues to be a menace. I am thinking of the time in our early history when the witch idea ruled the minds of the American people. From

WHY WARS MUST CEASE

21

the beginning there were groups who fought it, saw it as an obsolete superstition and made a concerted effort to educate the people against it. But in spite of all they could do, the idea that human beings were witches held its ground for a time. Then suddenly the belief disappeared from the pages of our history. Almost over night it was gone. What had happened was that the knowledge of science had grown so rapidly that people could no longer be fooled by the witch idea. It had become recognized as an obsolete idea. That does not mean that there are not instances, up to the very present, of people who are still ridden by a belief in witches. In New Mexico, not so many years ago, a young girl fell ill. She did not recover and her fiancé and a comrade set forth to wreak vengeance on an old woman who, the fiancé was convinced, had bewitched her. They tied a rope to each of the old woman's wrists, one young man took one rope, one took the other, both put their horses to a run, and they dragged the old woman over the rough road until they killed her. In Pennsylvania quite recently, a young man became so wrought up by his conviction that a witch had put a curse on him that he shot the supposed witch to death. If examples of this kind show how tenacious the witch idea is, they also show how obsolete it is. When people revert to it, as in the cases quoted, we now say they are crazy.

There was another time in our history when many of our best minds subscribed to the almost universal

custom of settling personal disputes by force. Duels were fought to settle points of honor between individuals. There was a time, too, when police forces were not only less adequate than now, but in many parts of the country there were none at all, so an individual had frequently to protect his own life and property by the use of force.

But times have changed. We no longer fight duels. No city today is without its police force and nearly all rural districts are protected by some kind of peace officers. Though there are still crimes of violence, it is only in sporadic instances that the individual feels it is his responsibility to do his own protecting of himself and his property by reverting to force. In the affairs of our daily lives we are gradually learning to coöperate for peaceful existence and the old law of the jungle is becoming obsolete in the relations between individuals. We can say that, by and large, it has been accepted amongst private individuals that the war idea, or the use of force as the one means of settling a dispute, is obsolete in so far as private affairs are concerned.

But in the case of the affairs of nations the war idea, like the witch idea in the individual case, hangs on and is still put into practice with out-moded and long-drawn-out cruelty. We still have wars because the majority of people, considered as national groups, do not yet recognize that the war idea is obsolete. Wars, as we very well know from many an example in the past, often give us instances of the danger of

not recognizing crucial things, by dragging on over a long period beyond their finish simply because it is not recognized that the war has come to an end. Historians tell us that the Civil War actually was ended at Gettysburg and yet the fighting went on for more than a year after that bloody battle was fought and many more lives were sacrificed. They now tell us that in the World War the Allies had really won at the Marne, that from that date forward the end was sure, and yet the war continued four long years and every nation sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives. It is even more terrible to contemplate the fact that on Armistice Day itself everybody in the high command knew that an armistice would be declared during the morning, and yet the firing went on till eleven o'clock and during those morning hours many lives were lost. History records many bloody battles which were fought for no better reason than that it was impossible to communicate with the combatants and tell them the war was over.

Let me define now what I conceive to be the meaning of the phrase "the war idea is obsolete" when applied to the affairs of nations and their inter-relations. An idea, or ideal, is obsolete if, when applied, it does not work. Going back into our own history again, we could not say that the war idea was obsolete at the time of our War of the Revolution, because we desired separation from England and we achieved it. There were two objectives for which the Civil War was fought. One was the question of the

right of any one of our states, or a group of states, to secede and become a separate country,—in other words, the question of the unity of this country. The other was slavery and its continued existence in this country. The Civil War freed the slaves and imposed upon those states which fought to secede the obligation to remain a part of the United States and preserve this country as a unified nation. The underlying cause of the Civil War, of course, was the quarrel between the agrarians and the industrialists, the agrarians being more numerous in the South and considering that slaves were necessary for their well-being, whereas the industrialists were more numerous in the North where slavery seemed unnecessary. This broader point, however, was probably not realized by the people who actually fought the war, though it stands out clearly to those who look back upon that war. On both points, however, we have to concede that the war idea was not obsolete at that time because, while we may think that both questions might have been settled more easily and efficaciously by joint agreement, still this war did accomplish what it set out to do, even though in a wasteful and costly manner.

The world conflagration which began in 1914 and ended in 1918, in which the great nations of Europe as well as the United States and Japan were involved, proved for the first time in our history that the war idea is obsolete as far as settling difficulties between nations is concerned. It did not achieve its objec-

tives. We were told the World War was fought, at least by our own country, to preserve democracy, to prevent the people of Europe from coming under the control of a despotic government which had no regard for treaties or the rights of neutral nations, and, above all, to end all future wars. Judged by the actual accomplishment of objectives, these four years were absolutely wasted. Far from preventing future wars, the settlements arrived at have simply fostered hostilities. There is more talk of war today, not to mention wars actually going on in the Far East and in South America, than has been the case in many long years. The world over, countries are armed camps and many peace-time industries have taken on potential value primarily as a preparation for war. How far forward the preparations for war are projected is shown by the fact that across the water a great leader tells his people that boys must be trained for war from the age of eight. Some time ago I drove over the French battlefields. The fields were covered with green but there were curious hollows where before the war the ground had been flat. The hollows were the remains of shell holes. The woods we passed through looked green, too, for Mother Nature rapidly covers up the ravages of man's stupidity, but the new growth was small and the old trees which once upon a time had been the giants of the forest were now gaunt, bare stumps. Out of the fields at evening came old men and boys. Apparently two generations were missing in these

French villages where placid rural life was again being carried on. One generation lay under the sod in the acres and acres of cemeteries that fill the French countryside. The next generation was in military training, getting ready to take the places of those who had already died for their country. War maneuvers were in progress and the young men who had grown up since the World War were learning to use bayonets and charge across the fields where their fathers had died.

The same handing on of the war idea, the war tradition, is as apparent in one great European nation as another. We are in danger of actual war today simply because we cannot convince enough people that the war idea is obsolete.

We are perhaps in this country the very best example of the fact that the war idea is obsolete and no longer accomplishes even part of what it sets out to do in practice. Though the underlying cause of the Civil War has not been even yet settled, though there still is a constant friction between agrarian and industrial states because their interests still conflict, we do not tolerate the suggestion that we should go to war about it. We acknowledge the fact that California has certain interests which we in the East do not share, but we know that, though probably no one will be completely happy, some sort of compromise will have to be reached. We do not intend that any state from Maine to Arizona shall drag us into civil war on local differences of opinion.

People are prone to say that history repeats itself and that today in the United States they can see the period of Roman decadence, if not actually repeating itself, at least drawing nearer and nearer. They are prone to say, too, that Greece and Rome were conquered by barbarians because they ceased to be able to fight. I doubt if these countries were conquered simply because they ceased to be as warlike as the barbarians. I think they were conquered because they ceased to be a forward-moving civilization. They had the opportunity and they failed. They came to a point where they declined physically, mentally and morally. It was not only that they could not fight from a physical standpoint, they were worthless and gradually decaying from every point of view.

If we do not find another way to settle our disputes and solve the problems of our generation, we will probably find our civilization disappearing also, but that will not happen because we are unable to fight, but because we do not find a substitute for war. There is no further use for war in business, or war between labor and capital, or war between the rich and the poor. The time for unbridled competition, or war, is at an end. We must coöperate for our mutual good.

It is high time to look realistically at this war idea. Many people in the past have felt that war brought a nation not only material gain when it was victorious, but certain moral gain. I have heard peo-

ple of my generation say that war developed certain qualities of comradeship and loyalty and courage which nothing else could do so well, but we seldom hear the equally true statement that war also gave the opportunity for the development of greed and cupidity to an extent scarcely possible under any other conditions. There has never been a war where private profit has not been made out of the dead bodies of men. The more we see of the munitions business, of the use of chemicals, of the traffic in other goods which are needed to carry on a war, the more we realize that human cupidity is as universal as human heroism. If we are to do away with the war idea, one of the first steps will be to do away with all possibility of private profit.

It does not matter very much which side you fight on in any war. The effects are just the same whether you win or whether you lose. We suffered less here in America in the World War than did the people of European countries, but at least some of our families can share the feelings of those across the sea whose sons did not come back, and today as a country we are realizing that economic waste in one part of the world will have an economic effect in other parts of the world. We profited for a time commercially, but as the rest of the world suffers, so eventually do we.

The easy answer to it all is that human nature is such that we cannot do away with war. That seems to me like saying that human nature is so made that

we must destroy ourselves. After all, human nature has some intelligence and the world's experience has already proved that there are ways in which disputes can be settled if people have intelligence and show good will toward one another. To do this on a national scale, as it is done on the individual, people must first be convinced that the war idea is obsolete. When people become convinced of this they will convince their governments and the governments will find the way to stop war.

CHAPTER III

BECAUSE WARS WASTE HUMAN LIFE

MARY E. WOOLLEY

"If you have seen but one day of war, you would
pray God you might never see another."

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

"AND for our country 'tis a bliss to die." As far back as the Iliad of Homer we go for the sentiment that has been throughout the ages one of the most powerful influences in human living. The glory of a death on the battlefield, the precept "come back with your shield or on it" have been extolled as the acme of heroism. Mistaken emphases have been in large measure responsible for the perpetuation of the war spirit. In this mistaken emphasis the imagination has played a part, painting the cause as always heroic, the motives invariably noble.

We need turn no further back than the World War for our illustration. The slogan "The war to end war," the conception of a crusade which would result in a happier and a better world made an appeal to the finest of our youth who were eager to get to the front, and to an army of men and women

WHY WARS MUST CEASE

31

who served "behind the lines" in Europe and at home, with unselfish devotion never before equalled.

The disillusionment was a bitter one but in spite of the realization of selfish interests working for war, of sordid conditions of modern warfare, dissipating the glamour, there still persists the old emphasis on "And for our country 'tis a bliss to die," and many are the methods still used to glorify war. The very panoply of war makes an appeal to the imagination; rolling drums, marching feet, stirring music, flying banners,—few human beings are unresponsive to that appeal.

There is a second emphasis blinding the eyes to the human, rather, to the *inhuman* aspect of war—and that is the use of terms. Take, for example, the word "effectives," the number of effectives that a country can put into the field, the number of effectives that a country loses, the very use of the word blinds our eyes to the tragedy. A friend who was in France in 1914 happened to be at the station of a French village, when a long train of cars passed with *poilus* on their way to the front. The train was made up of cattle-cars, rudely constructed, with openings for ventilation at a height where she could see only the eyes of the men crowded into the train, hundreds and thousands of eyes. To the end of her life never will she forget the expressions of those eyes, homesickness, bewilderment, terror, anguish, running the gamut of human emotions, the emotions of men torn

from their homes, going to—they knew not what. And those were "effectives"!

The extent of the human cost of the war is difficult to grasp. A tablet on a village green, giving the names of a score of boys whom one had known from childhood; the realization of the desolated homes, of the broken lives which they left behind, all this is understandable. But when the figures mount into millions, and the lives sacrificed, the homes broken, the multitude of other lives left desolate are not in our own home towns, but across the continent, across the oceans, that is different. It takes imagination to visualize those broken lives and broken hearts.

An exact statement of the loss of life among the forces engaged in the World War will never be available, cannot in the nature of the case be secured. A careful study of the data taken from official sources,¹ gives the following table of the dead:

The United States, including deaths among the enlisted men in the camps at home as well as in the expeditionary forces, lost 107,284; Great Britain, including colonial casualties, 807,451; France, 1,427,800; Russia, 2,762,064; Italy, 507,160; Belgium,² 267,000; Serbia, 707,343; Rumania, 339,117 (not including the deaths at Wallachi while controlled by Germany, the 18,000 prisoners taken by Bulgaria, of whom only 7,200 were returned alive, the 98,000 prisoners taken by Austria and Germany, of whom 43,000 were reported dead, 15,000 were returned alive and the remainder reported "still held");

Greece,³ 15,000; Portugal,⁴ 4,000; Japan,⁵ 300; Germany, 1,611,104; Austria-Hungary, 911,000; Turkey, 436,924; Bulgaria, 101,224, the last exclusive of deaths from influenza and those killed in the Macedonian retreat. This makes "a grand total" of 10,004,771 human beings in the military forces, who were killed.

That is to say, the World War death toll was larger than in any previous recorded war, almost double that of all the wars in the nineteenth century, a record "sufficiently impressive to stand by itself as a memorial of the Great World War without further comment."

The human costs among those engaged in fighting were not limited to deaths on the battlefield. The numbers of seriously wounded ran into the hundreds of thousands and even into the millions, in Germany exceeding a million and a half, and in Russia a million. Austria-Hungary came next with a record of 850,000; France 700,000; Great Britain over 600,000; Italy, half a million; the little countries of Serbia and Bulgaria each three hundred thousand and more; Rumania, 200,000; Turkey, 107,772. Figures of the seriously wounded in the forces of the United States are hardly more than in the smaller forces of Belgium, 43,000 as over against 40,000, given in the unofficial report of the latter country. The number of those restored in the United States forces was also larger, the Medical Staff profiting by the "new knowledge gained during the early part

of the War." Even so, 43,000 seriously wounded, of whom ten per cent remained seriously injured and five per cent partly disabled, added perceptibly to the human cost in our own country. The entire "harvest" of the War in seriously wounded or invalided was 6,000,000 as over against 13,000,000 "otherwise wounded," a proportion of about one to two.

To the known killed and wounded in the military forces ~~must be added the missing~~. From the reports made by some of the belligerent countries, it is considered a conservative estimate that fifty per cent of the "missing" had been killed. Mr. Bonar Law stated to Parliament that about sixty per cent of the missing in the British Army were probably dead; the estimate for Canada was fifty-six per cent; for France, forty per cent. That is, "So efficient were the deadly engines of destruction in the Great World War that in many cases men were literally blown to pieces and later reported as missing."

Using the estimate made by the Copenhagen War Study Society, based upon actual Russian army hospital experience during the first two years of the War, with the assumption that the table is "applicable to the whole period of the War" and that one-half of the prisoners or missing had lost their lives, the following table was constructed, showing the loss and degree of disability for the whole course of the War:

Actually known dead	10,004,771	
Presumed dead	2,991,800	
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Total	12,996,571	12,996,571
Wounded: Normality restored 44.5 per cent or	9,032,410	
Ability reduced 52 per cent or	10,554,726	
Total loss 3.1 per cent or	629,244	
Death from wounds .4 per cent or ...	81,190	20,297,570
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Total casualties, as far as known *		33,294,141

The Great World War took a heavy toll of deaths outside of the fighting forces, establishing "a new record in this as in so many other aspects." Epidemic diseases head the list, the Spanish influenza of 1918 totalling more than six million deaths, of which one million and a quarter were in the United States.

Tuberculosis was "terribly aggravated" by the War, in Belgium increasing "two-fold," by the official figures, "three-fold" by common report; the deaths from tuberculosis in Serbia in 1917 were 145.3 per 1,000,⁴ the anti-tuberculosis movement in process of organization before the War, being "wiped off" the slate.

"Money, men and thought—all were devoted to the destruction of human life, not to its conservation." And so it goes throughout Europe; in Italy the pre-war tuberculosis death rate had been decreasing for twenty-five years up to 1914, when "it changed to an abrupt increase of seventeen per cent in only two years."

Loss of life during the War in Germany alone,

from tuberculosis, intestinal and other diseases, due to privation and famine, is put at 812,296; " in Rumania, directly from the war and from famine, disease and starvation, the toll is estimated at over 800,000, "the highest percentage of mortality in any country." In Russia the number of deaths in the civilian population is estimated at 2,000,000, in addition to the "military deaths of 2,762,000"; and in Austria and Serbia spotted typhus, famine and privation were responsible for the loss of nearly 1,000,000 lives. In Macedonia the 1919 census showed that the male population had been reduced from 175,000 to 42,500 and in Thrace from 494,000 to 225,000.

A tragic by-product of the War were the massacres of Armenians, Syrians, Jews and Greeks, a total of four million killed during and as a result of the War.* In one afternoon, the Italian Consul at Trebizond reported, the whole Armenian population of the town, numbering from eight to ten thousand, was destroyed. In very truth, it was "a war of extermination"!

There is no more pitiful human inventory, than that of the children. In some countries, the statistics are almost unbelievable. After the liberation of Lille, examination revealed "20,000 children classed as 'degenerate', the result of insufficient or bad food, disease and malnutrition"; in Germany, the increase in tuberculosis cases was fifty per cent among children under five years of age; seventy-five per cent

among children between the ages of five and fifteen.

In less than a year and one-half after the beginning of the war, the statement was made concerning Poland: "One-third of a generation, the youngest, has practically ceased to exist, due to famine, pestilence and disease" and at the end of the War, an American in that country reported that "children under six years of age had practically all perished from starvation!"

Statistics of death and disease among children, fail to tell the whole story. Speaking of Serbia, Homer Folks calls attention to "another blight upon Serbia's childhood on a scale heretofore unknown, that of fatherlessness," a blight unhappily not confined to Serbia, where the estimate of "half-orphaned" children, ranges from 250,000 to 700,000.

The "human cost" is not bounded by statistics of dead and wounded. Who can estimate the physical agony, the mental anguish of the mortally wounded, not instantly killed; of the seriously wounded who lived, dragging out a miserable existence worse than death; of the multitudes of the starving; of the countless multitudes of the "desolated," with all that that word means?

But human misery must be no deterrent; on the contrary, it must be considered as desirable. After referring to the report that 763,000 German civilians died as a result of the blockade, an army officer said: "The result of the blockade in terms of human mis-

ery was unutterably dreadful, but as a measure of war it can only be described as a wonderful success.' " "A wonderful success" not ending with the blockade itself! Medical authorities estimated that the final effects might be expected two decades later, "when children who have survived the War attain adulthood." "

It is this long-drawn-out misery that, in many ways, marks a higher and a far more terrible cost than death itself, the casualties not in numbers of dead, but in endless suffering and disability. Among the victims of trench fever, affecting hearing and heart, in some groups twenty per cent were discharged "permanently unfit"; in an appalling number of instances, shell shock, "producing derangement of the nervous system, resulted in hysteria and in extreme cases in insanity"; the survivors of cerebrospinal fever in the British Army in 1915 were reported, "for the most part complete physical wrecks." By no means all of the casualties were reported; only those which put men out of the fighting ranks. The Copenhagen Society for the Study of the War gives the following per cents for first two years, of the permanently invalided: British, forty per cent, French, thirty per cent, Russian, twenty-three and six-tenths per cent, Germans, sixteen per cent.

That the cost of the War in terms of human life has bearing upon the future, goes without saying. In four of the principal countries involved, the following estimate was made of the time required to re-

place the men between twenty and forty-four years of age, who had lost their lives:

The United Kingdom ten years, Germany twelve years, Italy thirty-eight years, France sixty-six years.

Even more serious than the numerical loss, in its effect upon the future, is the loss through race deterioration. Considered first from the point of view of the physical, it is inevitable that War should take its heaviest toll from the physically fit. Every nation chooses first those who are normal in stature, free from disease and other infirmities, the "flower" of the nation, from the point of view of physique, and sends it to be the target for Death, leaving at home, for the perpetuation of the race, those rejected as physically unfit. The physically fit to die for their country, the physically unfit to live for it, that is an inevitable outcome of modern warfare. So careful a student as Ernest Bogart, speaking of the "appalling effects, some of them unquestionably permanent, of war, famine, pestilence and disease on the sufferers who did not die," says of them: "Years, and perhaps generations, will be required before this sacrifice of life can be made good, and the populations restored to normal."

A few weeks ago traveling through a state of the Middle West, my train stopped at a station, almost in the midst of the prairie. Almost, but not quite, for near the station was a mammoth building, the largest building, it seemed to me that I had ever seen. Not a prison, for there were no high surround-

ing walls, no grated windows, within sight. A hospital? Even a great state was not likely to have a public hospital of that size. "Yes, a hospital, a hospital for the men wounded in the World War, and"—the porter proudly added,—“they come from all over.” “They come from all over!” Sixteen years and more since the Armistice, “they come” and are still coming, these life-long victims of the Great War. A vivid imagination is not needed to picture the scenes within the walls of that mammoth building, the miles of hospital beds, the long procession of chairs for the crippled, the faces of the doomed, doomed to months and years of helpless waiting. And those others, those physical wrecks of humanity whom the advocates of militarism are not eager to have exposed to the public gaze and from whom we, however curious or pitying, turn away in horror.

The bookkeeping which follows war is a bookkeeping of human liabilities. And these liabilities are by no means confined to the physical. Homer Folks speaks of the loss of skilled men in little Serbia, one hundred and twenty-five physicians, for instance, dying of typhus, and a considerable number giving their lives in military service, leaving the civil population practically without medical service during the War.¹⁰

Not only the professions, humanitarian, social, and learned, shared in the hideous toll exacted by the War. There was a shiver of apprehension when it was known that Kreisler had enlisted. Even those

who sing the glory of a death on the battlefield drew the line at the geniuses of the world. An *imaginary* line, for there are no charmed lives in the domain of Mars. Rupert Brooke and Alan Seeger are a symbol, a symbol of countless lives that have left the world of beauty poorer by their passing.

There can never be a census of the *potentially gifted*, offered as a sacrifice to the Great War. A striking address, in the autumn of 1915, was an appeal to the college students of America to prepare themselves to take the place of the potential scholars, who, in the first year of the War, had fallen on the battlefields of Europe. The waste of intellectual and spiritual wealth, for which the Great War was responsible, manifestly, can never be put into categories.

“The human costs of the War” are even more apparent in 1934 than in 1918. Homer Folks was right, when he said: “that the war has gone much deeper into the fabric of human life than one who has lived during the war on this side of the Atlantic can easily understand; that some of its worst effects are only now beginning to be felt; that they will project themselves very far into the future; that it is the most serious strain which western civilization has ever undergone, and it inevitably raises the question whether that civilization could stand another such strain.” He is also right in his comment that this picture should surprise no one since, “It is of the essence of war to produce such results. That

was the intention of the war-makers. Each side was trying to do just these things to the other, and both measurably succeeded. In peace, men are engaged in many and diverse occupations, but they may all be summed up as the doing of those things which they believe will make life healthful, comfortable, and attractive. In war, men's whole effort is just the opposite; it is to destroy life and to make life so uncomfortable, unhealthful, and unendurable that the enemy will cry, 'Enough.'

"Enough!" It is time for humanity to learn that lesson and determine no longer to allow the human waste that is called "War."

FOOTNOTES

¹ Ernest L. Bogart, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War." A study under the "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace."

² Non-official.

³ Bogart, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War."

⁴ Homer Folks, "The Human Costs of the War."

⁵ Bogart, quoting from *Muenchener Medizinische Wochenschrift*.

⁶ Estimate of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief.

⁷ "Direct and Indirect Costs of the War."

⁸ Kirby Page, "National Defense."

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Homer Folks, "Human Costs of the War."

CHAPTER IV

BECAUSE WARS COST TOO MUCH

Mrs. WILLIAM BROWN MELONEY

"Every war, even for the nation that conquers, is nothing less than a disaster."

GENERAL VON MOLTKE.

THE very term "cost of war" is a misleading one. The cost of the Great War defies definition. Even the material and fiscal costs of the actual military conduct of the war cannot be exactly estimated. When we realize that research bureaus in various parts of the world, that government bureaus and the League of Nations, all combined, have not in sixteen years been able to sum up the total material cost of the World War, for which civilization is now paying and must continue to pay, we get a faint idea of the difficulty of covering this subject. Libraries of books have been written in a vain effort to arrive at a complete estimate.

That great authority on peace, whose mind has helped construct some of the best instruments against war which have blessed this generation, Dr. James T. Shotwell, probably knows more about the

causes and the costs of war than any man I know and yet, in discussing this subject, he invariably prefaces his remarks with the reminder that this generation, which cannot completely pay for the war, cannot even estimate the actual cost of it. However, he has hazarded one prophecy. The \$200,000,000,000 agreed to in the Brussels Conference in 1920 as the cost of the war will certainly expand to \$500,000,000,000 if we can assemble the known cost to date.

The "Great War" will be so designated in the story of mankind, but perhaps not for the reasons which in our generation seem apparent. There have been other conflicts in history which involved almost as many nations. There have been, for various causes, periods in which there was great loss of life. The total deaths from diseases in the warring nations in a single year now equal the total number of military casualties for the period of the war. The total of one human ill, influenza, did, during the war, account for more dead than all of the direct casualties of war in the same period. But the Great War, which lasted only four years, was greater than the Thirty Years War, greater than the Hundred Years War, greater than the Napoleonic wars, greater than all the wars of history put together, in its economic implications.

What happened between August 1, 1914, and November 11, 1918, drove a chasm through history. On this side of the chasm is a new civilization. New forms of government, new alignments of nations,

new standards of living, new class consciousness—a new civilization.

It was the one-time misguided concept of philosophers that war, at the cost of a few lives more or less, was one of the energizing forces of life and the producer rather than the destroyer of prosperity. The Great War for all time established the fallacy of that point of view.

Greed made the Great War. Greed for money and greed for place.

Future historians will probably agree that even the best of our political and economic leaders were blind to the swift moving economic and political changes which were taking place at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. They were, therefore, unprepared to meet the vast political, social and economic problems inherent in the war and the even more complex and widespread ones which followed the Treaty of Versailles. With the growth of industrial organization, the vast and incomprehensibly complex development of commerce and her twin daughters, transportation and communication, there had been born a new order, one may even say a new world, demanding new minds to guide it in its path. Few minds with vision were grasping the fact that a new world organization existed, in which a rain storm on the plains of Patagonia meant profit or loss in a London counting house; in which the invention and manufacture of an automobile in Detroit meant social and economic

upheaval in Georgia, in the Balkans. A world was brought into being in the nineteenth century so inter-related and interdependent that every advance, every step forward carried a further relationship among all the peoples of the world.

In the final analysis, the responsibility for starting the World War was not a murder on a Sarejevo street, but rather the stupidity of the human race, which has long displayed a tendency to learn only through disaster. The economic and nationalistic organization of the world proved to be a house of cards. America was one card in that structure. Economically, the United States was in the World War from 1914 until the end, although, with a sincere reluctance to face reality and a self-deception as a people, we chose to describe ourselves as neutral until 1917.

We thought we could, and the government thought we could, stay out of the war, because of our geographic isolation, traditions, history, past experience, and material advantages. Yet, in order to maintain this policy of neutrality, we asserted our neutral rights—the right to use the sea for our shipping. The belligerents had to carry their war to the seas, and so had to block our attempt to make our neutrality profitable or possible. The result was that we almost became involved with Great Britain, and ultimately our very struggle to preserve neutrality drew us into the war. The inevitable conclusion is that

even neutrality may involve a peace-loving nation in war.

When the material cost to the United States for the World War finally is counted, it will be necessary for us to go back to the factories made idle and the fruits of the fields left undelivered to their markets, as early as the spring of 1915, when freight cars were backed up for miles in New Jersey, laden with American products which could not reach their former buyers because shipping was temporarily at a standstill. We had no merchant marine sufficient to carry American products to their destination, and foreign ships sold their space immediately at excess prices to the warring nations for the transportation of war supplies.

In New England, where were manufactured boots which might be used in battle, factories were operated and shipping was completed, but the peacetime products, such as plows from New Hampshire and Illinois, apples and oranges from our groves, or fresh meat from our plains, or vegetables from our truck farms, all these choked the railroad sidings and the warehouses, and frequently were total losses to their producers. These were war losses for which there are no available figures, but which were the beginning of the depression of 1915.

While it is true that our official battle casualties did not begin until a regiment of American marines engaged in the second battle of the Marne, more

than three years after the war's beginning, our economic casualties most certainly commenced with the beginning of mobilization in Europe.

One may even say that before the ministers and politicians had formulated the plans to make a slaughter-house of the continent of Europe, the business men of the world had already set up the framework of organizations which were to build counting houses on the dead bodies of the world's youth. The material price was already so stupendous that in these twenty years we have had to set up symbols for the amounts of monetary values involved. This cost is so vast that it could not possibly be indicated on any ledger, but for the purpose of illustration we will select a few details which will dimly indicate the vastness of the total. For instance, the Army has admitted that it cost \$25,000 "for every man who was put in action." This does not include the cost of the high explosives he used nor the deadly gases he dispersed. It includes only the cost of finding the man, of making his record, of hiring the people who trained him, of housing him, feeding and clothing him, transporting him and insuring him. Accepting this figure for a basis, it totaled for the A. E. F. \$102,427,525,000.

For temporary wooden crosses and stars (Jewish) to mark the graves of slain soldiers the Allies, it is estimated, paid over five million dollars. A small item but a heart-breaking one.

The war created new technique in warfares; new and tremendously costly. Germany in one day in

the battle of the Marne used more ammunition than was consumed in the whole war of 1870-1871.

Reminding the reader that I am not attempting to give a complete picture of the material costs of the war, I want to indicate a few of the human losses which were material losses as well. Yet they will continue to be indefinable and may be traced by later generations only as scars of retardation in racial trends. What I mean, for instance, is this: In one village in France, Landres-St. Georges in the Argonne, six months after the evacuated population had returned to its ruined town, it was found that a large percentage of the children had developed tuberculosis from malnutrition. Elsewhere in this book there is a discussion of the damages to health caused by war. Human suffering apart, we must also reckon with the material cost of curing the diseased. And we must also include, although we cannot reckon the actual cost, the reduced earning capacity of those tubercular patients; a material loss to their families and their nations.

There is another phase of this cost which defies accurate computation. But in my own work I have been brought close to it and I feel it has a place in this chapter.

During the four years of the war there was practically no building of homes in the United States. Man power and materials were diverted to war needs. In 1920 Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, announced that America was short one

million homes. The high wages for civilian labor during the war had created a whole new group of potential home owners. They were mostly people who were now subject to exploitation and they were exploited. Although the "Better Homes" movement came into being as an effort to help educate the public in home building, it was not able to stop the tide of speculative building of poorly constructed houses sold for more than their value all over the nation.

Two evil economic results of this were, first, that many people undertook larger mortgages than they could carry and eventually lost their homes and their savings; second, that many banks carrying such mortgages eventually had to foreclose at losses and that hundreds of hard-working investors paid for it. There are no figures available for this type of economic loss brought about indirectly by the war.

It is not within my province to discuss the spiritual losses of the war, but there is a material aspect in the loss of faith of the hard-working, worthwhile people who have been betrayed and disillusioned by a wholesale exploitation.

Immediately following the war it was computed at the International Financial Conference at Brussels, 1920, that the total national indebtedness incurred by the warring nations during those four years had been 225 billions of dollars. Later estimates put the figure still higher. "Two hundred and twenty-five

billions" are relatively finite as the terms impinge upon our consciousness. Two hundred is a comprehensive figure and billion is the word which we learned in school comes after million. However, in figures of money, of man-hour units of production, the figures are beyond the scope of the human mind fully to comprehend. They are a symbol, a rather meaningless symbol. It is as if almost all of the American continent, with all that it possesses in richness and promise, were suddenly to be wiped out of the world and the world told to go to work and earn its equivalent. The estimated wealth of this United States is 300 billion. But this sum covers only the recognizable and tangible cost of the war. To this figure must be added the intangible but basically computable costs of human flesh. A steer that we slaughter has a certain value; some average can be made of the economic value of the millions whose blood, mixed with the mud of Flanders and the other warring fronts, did not even make bricks to build with. Who will compute the value to the world of twenty million young men? And to this figure must be added the costs of the several armies of occupation of enemy territory, a continuation of military activities which did not cease until ten years following the Armistice.

Nor does the 225 billion include the full interest charge of the war debt, a charge which in the ensuing years has yearly increased until it has become a crippling burden upon the treasuries of the debtor

nations—and the creditor nations which must pay their people though the borrowing nations do not repay in full. When this figure was arrived at, the restoration of devastated areas had hardly begun and the costs of this war necessitated undertakings undreamed of. Nor could any of the involved nations compute the pensions, compensations and other provisions for ex-soldiers and their dependents which were to develop as the years passed. In June 30, 1933, its computation was \$40,583,000,000. This increase progresses each year and the diminishing point in terms of years cannot be yet determined. President Coolidge in 1928 predicted that the cost of the war to the American people would reach 100 billion dollars. This was a fiscal estimate and did not include all economic loss, nor did the President foresee the increase which will have to continue in veterans' compensation as a result of the depression.

Nor do these costs include the war-time distortion of economic activity which was diverted to the government service during the period of and following the war. Nor do they include the costs of the scattered warfare which continued for several years in all parts of the world and are attributable as a direct result of the "Great War," or as an outgrowth of the peace treaties. Such are the costs of the armed intervention in Russia, the Rumanian-Hungarian War of 1919, the Polish-Russian War of 1920, the Greco-Turkish War, with Britain's Mesopotamian

support, costing 100 million pounds alone. These costs can, today, be only roughly computed.

And there are further costs to be enumerated. In an effort to repair the dislocation of trade and reach something approximating a pre-war economic stability, it was necessary in the case of Italy to pay a grain subsidy, in America a shipping subsidy, a wage subsidy for coal miners in England, and countless other subsidies in these and other countries for the benefit of consumers or producers in the form of housing construction subsidies, and grants to individual industries and services. Together with these charges directly traceable to the war are the provisions for war-time relief, and post-war relief, both public and private, for the unemployed, the distressed and starving peoples of the countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe during the years immediately following the war.

To these costs which have been roughly enumerated, there must be added the growth of governmental expenditures since the war for armament, defense and preparedness, obviously occasioned by the sense of distrust left behind in the wake of the war and the feeling of conflict caused by new boundaries. In the question of armament there must be considered the fact that with this war science for the first time came into its own in the field of armaments. Science, perhaps one of the most extravagant of Mars's handmaidens, has made the technique of war expensive to a degree beyond comprehension.

During the war the administrative expenses of the governments involved rose to unprecedented proportions. Following the war, while there were indeed some retrenchments, those administrative costs have remained on a level far above any previous period in history.

I quote this from Dr. James T. Shotwell. "The last devastation of the World War was in Ohio and Kansas, where the structure of credit collapsed as the result of the system erected because of the World War, of a false structure of credit in which the common man the world over became involved. The money he thought he had made in war-time profits went down with his savings in peace-time industry in the ruin of the great depression, which was the product, directly or indirectly, of the World War. Directly, through the exhaustion of a consumer market; indirectly, through a creation of false policies of national economics."

In 1928 France took account of her position in the world. Her debts, both war and post-war, had risen to nearly 300 billion francs. France finally stabilized the franc but not before three-quarters of the wealth of the nation had been liquidated by the process of devaluation. Germany's devaluation of the mark was the inevitable and catastrophic conclusion of an economically unbearable situation. As the mark dropped in value Germany's middle class was virtually destroyed. Insurance, investments, mortgages, savings and bank deposits were wiped out utterly.

The subsequent denial of the contractual gold obligations of the several debts by those nations which went off the gold standard was not entered upon without economic loss equal to and commensurate with the degree to which each nation devalued its currency. The interrelation of these various aspects of the war's aftermath bears more than a contributing share of the economic débâcle which swept the world beginning in the fall of 1929.

There are almost none who fail to agree that the world depression is directly attributable to the World War. And it follows that the economic loss entailed by that depression must in great part, if not completely, be charged off as a cost entailed by the war.

The bare enumeration of the costs directly and indirectly related to the war justify the claim that it is impossible to write down in monetary figures the war cost. One is constrained to set forth merely those known costs and to direct one's mind toward the multitude of other costs which are incomputable but which either completely or in part must be laid to the Great War.

Even were it possible to assemble and set forth figures for the various economic losses above enumerated, it would not be possible to show that those figures represented to any true degree the total loss involved. Let us recite two examples to clarify this point. The total figure covering the cost of rebuilding the devastated areas of the war is no index of the value destroyed or the productivity of those areas,

which was halted over a period of years. The rebuilding of a factory in Lille, even assuming that the government re-created a value commensurate with the value destroyed, does not repay the loss incurred by the inactivity of that factory, the loss of its markets and the innumerable other losses incidental to the shutting up of an industry. The same picture may be drawn of farms in the devastated area. Rebuilding the barn and house and fences and replacing on the land the same number of domestic animals as were destroyed does in no way represent the complete loss to the farmer of that land. Again, the cost of unemployment relief does not represent the economic loss of millions of unemployed men, an economic loss to be figured not only in terms of their own destroyed condition of life, but in the loss of their buying power and the lessened productivity of the nation as well. Who can enumerate these costs?

The question: "The Cost of the War?" is asked by a bankrupt world.

COSTS OF THE WAR

DIRECT COSTS OF WAR.

1. *International Financial Conference Brussels.* 1921, estimated total national indebtedness of warring nations to be.....225 Billions
2. *Economic loss of five million men* between 17 and 55, physically and mentally the best manpower of the warring nations. America an-

anticipated her casualty loss by the purchase of one million dollars worth of temporary wooden crosses.....Not yet computed.

3. *Insurance for men killed in war*, both private and government.....Not yet computed.
4. *Veteran's relief*, bonuses, pensions, care for widows and surviving families. Between 1921 and 1933 America's estimated cost of \$25,298,000,000 was increased by \$6,164,000,000 through Veteran's Administration expenditures.....Not yet computed.
5. *Interest on War Debts.* There are no clear figures available which give returns under this heading for the warring nations. America's increase between 1921-1933 was \$9,033,000,000. These costs did not begin until the Financial Conference was over.....Not yet computed.
6. *Settlement of war claims.* America's increase 1921-1933 was \$88,000,000. Not yet computed.
7. *Restoration of Devastated Areas.* The total figures for this cost are not ascertainable and such figures as might be ascertained would be no true indication of the actual loss but only of the amount expended by the several nations. Nor would such a figure represent losses incurred by interruption of productive activity. Up to 1919 France had spent nine billion francs in reconstruction of devastated areas. Eighty-seven billion had been spent by 1930. Part of this expenditure may be seen in the increase of the French national debt from 219 billion in 1919 to 298 billion in 1928. The

restoration of devastated areas likewise in part explains the increase of the German debt during this period.

8. *Liquidation of War.*

Demobilization of armed forces, compensation for cancelled contracts. Many of these costs can be isolated or computed.

9. *Costs of Continued Military Operations.*

The war machine did not cease to operate the instant the Armistice was signed.

- a. Armies of occupation continued in enemy territories for ten years following the war.
- b. Except in some of the deflated countries, 1921 did not see demobilization of armies to pre-war strength.

10. *War Diversion of Economic Functions.*

No estimate has ever been suggested to cover the war-time diversion of peace-time industries. Transportation and communications chief instances: railroads, shipping, telegraph.

11. *Warfare Following Armistice.*

- a. Armed intervention in Russia.
- b. Rumanian-Hungarian War 1919.
- c. Polish-Russian War 1920.
- d. Greco-Turkish War. England's share alone was one-half billion.
- e. Ruhr activities and invasion by France.

12. *Relief Activities.*

War-time relief—largely through private agencies in Belgium, Germany, Armenia. Various relief activities directed toward the needs

of the civilian population of the warring nations.

13. *Insurance and Private Loss of War.*

- a. Life insurance of war casualties.
 - b. Shipping insurance.
 - c. Insurance in war areas.
- Non-computable private losses of property and investment during war.

NOTE.

No quantitative appraisal seems feasible; there exists no precise balance of gains and losses, assets and liabilities. At best it is only possible to segregate, among forces that have been shaping economic development since the war some of the outstanding detrimental factors that may be traceable to the war to a greater or lesser degree.

1. *Dislocation in Production, Trade and Prices.*

Natural dislocations of the economic upheaval of war resulted in war-time and post-war-time governmental subsidies to both producers and consumers. Italy's grain subsidy; England's wage subsidy to coal miners; America's shipping subsidy. These are only a few of the outstanding instances.

2. *Relief—Post-war.*

Immediately following the war governmental and private agencies began to relieve the distress of the unemployed, famined and distressed peoples of Central, Eastern and even Western Europe.

- a. Even during the prosperous years following 1921 there was a severe unemployment problem in England, in Germany, in France.

3. *Growth of Armament Expenditures.*

In no case did the warring nations return to a pre-war basis of armament expenditure. In almost every case the armament costs remained at a peak peace-time point.

- a. This war left behind it a new technique in warfare. New and tremendously costly. Germany in one day in the battle of the Marne expended more munitions than were consumed in the whole war of 1870-1871. The German weekly gun barrel issue exceeded the demands of the previous war.
- b. This war marked the advent of science into warfare, together with hitherto unknown and expensive instruments of war. It was the first war to be operated under the new ideas of industrial mass production.
- c. Territorial changes, distrust and an atmosphere of conflict in the world have operated to maintain an expensive policy of militarism even down to the present moment.

4. *Increased and Continued Governmental Expenses.*

The war-time expenses of the various governments were increased to unprecedented proportions under the stress of economic implications never accompanying previous wars.

Following the war every government has suffered from an inability to reduce the ad-

ministrative costs of government. Bureaucracy was so deeply implanted that it became political suicide to try to eliminate it.

5. *Capital and Interest Rates.*

The loss of capital with consequent high interest rates resulted in a tremendous loss occasioned by the increased cost of peace-time borrowings for peace-time and public uses. Witness post-war history of interest rates—even during boom years.

6. *Monetary Devaluation.*

Under the stress of war losses and increased economic burdens and debts, devaluation to the following occurred—in France 4/5; Belgium 5/6; Italy 3/4; Germany complete. Within the last two years England and America devalued their currencies.

The actual loss of this monetary management cannot be accurately determined. In France it meant the almost complete liquidation of the *rentier* class, and everywhere it represents a virtual economic cancellation of the property, the insurance and the savings of the middle classes.

7. *Economic Retardation.*

- a. The rate of growth of output was retarded. Dr. Carl Snyder of the N. Y. Federal Reserve Bank computed at 200 billion in raw materials and 200 billion in finished products. This sum he suggests as the *economic costs* of the war to the world.

The war left, as an immediate heritage, a vast amount of values destroyed or wasted and of

things undone, calling for restoration; high costs of that reconstruction work; in many cases there was a distorted and one-sided productive capacity.

I submit the foregoing information, not as a complete picture of the costs of the war, but as data I have been able to collect, and as high lights on some parts of the vast canvas. Not even Dr. Einstein could figure out the accurate estimates of the cost of the war, nor their totals. Too many of the vital statistics and important evidence have been destroyed or are not yet available.

CHAPTER V

BECAUSE WARS PRODUCE ECONOMIC CHAOS

FLORENCE BREWER BOECKEL

"Wars are not paid for in war time; the bill comes later."

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

THE economic depression following the World War has been for Americans a more vivid experience than the war itself. The result is that their attention has been absorbed by the consequence and diverted from the cause. Unfortunately, the connection between war and economic collapse is not so immediate as the connection between the flame and burn which leads to a protective dread of fire in the burnt child. The worst economic results of war are felt too long after the smoke of battle has cleared away for them to be clearly attributed in the public mind to war or counted in its cost.

Yet in the world we are living in today the one certain result of war is economic depression. No participant can hope to escape that result by superiority in arms, by prowess, or by victory itself, nor

is there any protection for the non-combatant in neutrality. One reason that the irresistible sequence of events leading from war to paralysis of trade is so far unrecognized that "another war" can be suggested as a remedy for the evils produced by the last one is that war-times themselves are good times; there is employment for everyone and prices are high. Immediately after a war there is a collapse followed by a quick pick-up in business—the serious depression comes several years later. The war's responsibility for the depression is obscured by this gap in time. Furthermore, it is not only the destruction of tangible wealth which leads to the depression but the destruction of intangible economic and financial relationships which are hidden from the view of ordinary men and women in such abstract terms as "currencies," "international exchange," "the gold standard," "tariff policies."

There is on record a conversation between an American economist and an elderly, much traveled woman who met aboard an Atlantic liner, returning from Europe shortly after the World War. They were discussing the results of the war. The woman demanded: "Young man, have you seen the devastated areas in France? Until you have, you will never have the slightest conception of what this war has meant!" "Madam," the economist replied, "have you seen the meaning of the depreciated and isolated exchanges, the disorganized banking and currency systems, the disrupted trade and commer-

cial relations of the world, the maladjustments in world economic organization which the war has produced? Until the meaning of these things is seen, the meaning of the war cannot be realized."

The interdependence of nations was already such in the early years of the nineteenth century that the dislocation of trade and finance during the period of the Napoleonic wars resulted in the complete economic disorganization of Europe. A tremendous increase in debts, a sharp rise in prices, a sudden collapse of credit, bankruptcies and bank failures, in the 1830's, reduced one out of every eleven inhabitants of England to pauperism and led to a period of poverty and distress just before the middle of the century known as the "hungry forties."

In the Franco-German war, also, both countries suffered economically, although in that war the expenditures were not so great but that it was possible for victorious Germany to impose an indemnity which covered her actual costs, and for France to pay this indemnity in gold without bankrupting herself. In spite of this, German economists of the time pointed out that the French indemnity did not compensate the private losses of German citizens, that its payment meant the loss of French customers to German industry, that the large sums of money received from France sent German prices up, increased the cost of living, checked exports, and resulted, actually, in a period of distress in Germany. Ten years after the war Bismarck himself declared

that he was "struck with the general and growing distress in Germany as compared with France."

The steps by which war, regardless of any particular governmental policies, leads irresistibly to the breakdown of the world's economic organization can be more clearly understood if the causes of the present depression are traced back to their origins, first in the actual war period, next in the terms of the peace settlement, and finally in post-war policies based on war psychology which cannot be suddenly laid aside when the war is technically ended.

At the outbreak of the World War, rapid transport and communication and international division of production, due to the intensive industrialization of a few countries, had made the world an economic unit and created a world market upon which all nations were dependent for their prosperity. Any one of several of the economic changes which immediately resulted upon the outbreak of war would have been sufficient to disorganize these world-trade and financial relationships.

For one thing, in each of the warring countries, millions of men normally employed in industry were called to the colors. The whole industrial system was turned over-night from the production of goods used in everyday business and everyday living to the production of shot and shell, of guns and armored cars, and of equipment for the huge armies of men that were being made ready for action. This shift at the beginning of the war was met by the employment

of displaced workers in the army and in war industries and by turning the entire effort and resources of the government to a solution of the problems involved. But the shift from peace- to war-industries means a shift back again which can lead only to chaos. At the end of a war, governments find themselves with their resources drained and are neither able nor willing to face the problems of the return to peace with the energetic determination with which they met the problems of war.

In 1914, the principal industries of many countries, and therefore the jobs and livelihood of their citizens, depended on raw materials controlled by other governments. Those countries which had specialized in industrial production were dependent on others for food. Trade relationships were not direct bilateral relationships but multilateral. Aside from the necessity of exchanging home products in order to obtain foreign products, machine production had so far increased output beyond home consumption that foreign markets were necessary for profitable operation. Trade was conducted at long distances and many of the commodities exchanged required considerable periods of time, and therefore advance outlays of capital and extension of credit, for their production or manufacture. Large amounts of capital were invested by the citizens of one country in the industries of others.

To carry on such a system of international trade, there must be a constant relationship between cur-

rencies of different countries and a common standard of value into which the money of the various countries can be translated. Not what this standard is, but its maintenance, is the important thing from the point of view of this particular discussion, that is, from the point of view of the effect of war upon financial relationships. As it happened, during the nineteenth century, all the large countries, except India and China, had agreed upon gold as this standard. There was a sufficient amount of gold in the possession of each government to serve as a basis for its currency, to provide, that is, for redeeming its currency in gold. It is also essential that the relationship of the price of goods in different countries remain practically the same, in order that trade transactions covering any period of time may be carried on with some degree of security. In the years before the war, this could be counted upon because of the following set of facts: If the exports of one country were greater than its imports, the balance due was paid to it in gold. As gold increased in any given country, the quantity of available credit, if not of actual currency, was increased. This tended, in part by increasing purchasing power, to increase prices. When the prices of goods in one country were higher than the prices in another, its exports naturally decreased and its imports increased. Thereupon, it, in turn, was forced to pay for the excess of imports over exports with gold. Its quantity of gold decreased, and the balance tended to be restored.

Stable conditions, confidence and credit are, it is clear, the first requirements for the successful functioning of such a system of world trade. They are also the first casualties of war.

The World War promptly threw the whole mechanism of international trade and finance out of gear. Any major war today is necessarily a conflict between great powers which in normal times carry on an extensive trade with one another, and becomes a war with their own customers. Their trade is instantaneously cut off by a declaration of war, with heavy losses through failure of anticipated payments and cancellation of contracts. Other currents of trade are blocked, frontiers are closed, shipments of goods seized and destroyed, shipping facilities curtailed. A sharp rise in prices follows upon the excessive demand for certain articles and the rapidly decreased supply of others. War prices reach a level high above any peace period. A rise in prices produced by extraordinary conditions must be followed, when those conditions no longer exist, by a price decline. A severe drop in prices is the invariable accompaniment of economic depression. To a war-produced price decline there is added the disrupting effect of all the other trade and financial dislocations caused by war.

Upon the outbreak of war, belligerent governments are faced with the necessity of making expenditures far in excess of their revenues. Rather than impose heavy taxes, which would dampen the war spirit, war governments borrow enormous sums

which they rapidly consume in the destructive processes of the war. What they literally do is to take the savings of their people and blow them up, producing nothing out of which repayment can later be made.

Promptly upon the outbreak of the World War, the governments involved abandoned the gold standard, that is, they refused to continue to redeem their currencies in gold. The result was that the relative values of the currencies of different countries changed from day to day. Unwilling or unable to call further upon the resources of their own people, the warring nations soon borrowed from other countries. The European Allies at first turned to England for loans, but later the United States, which had previously been in debt to Europe because of the foreign investments which had been made in this country during the period of its development, became the world's creditor. Under normal conditions a shift in the position of debtors and creditors is gradual and leads to a change in their trade relations. Under the conditions of the war the United States which was called upon to lend money was also depended upon to supply goods.

Besides these specific effects of war conditions on the economic organization of the world, there are far-reaching and lasting disturbances caused by the fact that the economic life of the warring countries is taken under practically complete government control and is guided by political considerations. It is

one of the contradictions involved in the incompatibility of war with modern civilization that, while certain economic interests and characteristics of the present economic system are recognized as causes of modern war, the effect of war is the disruption of the economic organization. The economic welfare of their own people as a whole becomes of less importance to governments than the crippling of enemy countries.

Such—very briefly indeed—are the consequences of the economic policies of governments at war. To what policies do they inevitably lead in the peace settlement?

When, at the end of the World War, negotiations for an armistice were finally begun, the proposals of statesmen, such as those embodied in Wilson's Fourteen Points and in speeches by Lloyd George on the need for a general restoration of peace-time conditions, showed a certain degree of understanding of what the real economic situation of the victors was. But these more reasonable proposals, attempting to open the way for general recovery, were inevitably modified or abandoned under the pressure of political considerations. The promises held out to their peoples, the hopes that had been raised that they would receive compensation for their sufferings and losses had to be met if governments were to survive. To have attempted to educate their publics in an understanding of the policies, which, at the close of

the war, were required if the economic life of the world was to be reorganized on anything like a stable basis, would have meant that the futility of the war, for which these same governments had called upon their peoples to make bitter sacrifices, must be admitted.

The financial and economic disorganization of Europe at the time of the Armistice is indicated by such facts and figures as these: With the gold standard abandoned, no common measure of currency existed as a basis for international trade; currencies were unstable, and prices high and fluctuating. Property reaching into billions of dollars in value was destroyed; equipment was broken down; transportation systems so disorganized and deteriorated that even where goods needed by the people could be produced they could not be shipped. The productivity of the soil, which had been worked to exhaustion without renewal through proper care, was estimated to have decreased forty per cent; coal production essential to industry and transportation had fallen off thirty per cent. Savings had been wiped out; war expenditures had not resulted in increased production or accumulated profits to replace expenditures. Productive labor had been reduced, not alone by the deaths and disablement of millions of men in the war, but by a tremendous increase in sickness and loss of physical vigor.

Had these same conditions been produced by some extraordinary natural catastrophe, the difficulties of

reorganizing trade would have been almost insurmountable. But the fact that they were due to deliberate war policies meant that to correct them it would have been necessary to reverse these policies and undo the injuries which they had been designed to bring about. To restore the prosperity of their own people, the victorious governments would have had to seek the equal recovery of their victims, and also to give them special trade advantages inasmuch as their economic condition was relatively worse. No such change in government policies of right-about-face on the part of government officials, interested primarily in political consequences, is within the realm of possibility. In other words, peace settlements cannot correct the effects of war.

As a matter of fact, in 1916 the Allied governments had met in Paris to decide upon an economic program. The conference declared that Germany and her allies planned "a contest on the economic plane which will not only survive the re-establishment of peace but will at that moment attain its full scope and intensity." For the period of the war, it was decided that the Allied countries should prohibit economic intercourse between their nationals and the nationals and territories of the enemy countries. All business interests of the citizens of the enemy countries in Allied territories were to be confiscated, and stricter measures were to be taken to prevent imports from neutral to enemy countries. It was also decided that, following the cessation of hostil-

ities, the Allied countries should make special arrangements for an exchange among themselves of the products growing out of their natural resources. The trade of the enemy powers on the other hand was to be checked in every way possible.

These policies, adopted as actual war measures, were carried over through the terms of the settlement into what were supposed to be times of peace. In other words, it was only the military operations of the war which ended with the Armistice. The enemy countries were deprived of territories which were an integral part of their economic life, of shipping facilities both by sea and by land, of the sources of power and raw materials necessary for the reestablishment of their industries. Granted that they could under these conditions develop any trade, they were to be forced to give most-favored-nation treatment to the victorious nations, although they were not to receive such treatment in return.

But the victorious governments sought not only to make the economic recovery of the defeated nations impossible, they sought also to obtain reparations which would cover the entire cost of the war. The fact that the excessive cost of modern war makes any such repayment by defeated nations impossible had been little understood, and if recognized at the end of the war could not then be admitted. The amount of the reparations exacted was economically fantastic. They could, furthermore, be paid in only two ways, in goods or in gold. For the victorious

countries to have accepted any large part of the payment in goods would have meant restoration of the system of production in the enemy countries and competition with their own productive enterprises. Payment was demanded in gold without any acknowledgment of the fact that the defeated countries could acquire gold in sufficient quantity only by the sale of their goods abroad.

Other obstacles to a resumption of normal trade were created by the peace settlement. Political considerations led to the creation of new states and thereby to new boundaries and trade barriers. The transfer of colonies and change of control through mandates meant the alteration of established trade currents. The spirit which marked the terms of settlement so far as the enemy nations were concerned carried over even into the relationship of the victorious governments. That part of the 1916 agreement which looked to a consolidation of their economic interests was forgotten.

These, then, were the contributions of the peace settlement to the steady progress of the world from war to economic depression. What were the conditions which developed in the post-war years?

With the end of the war, prices fell precipitately. There was a short industrial boom with over-expansion in response to the demand, and anticipated demand, for many kinds of peace-time goods of which people had been deprived, but it was soon found

that, though the demand for goods existed, the ability to pay for them did not. Obstacles to international trade steadily increased. A spirit of intensive nationalism and desire for self-sufficiency, natural products of war, led to quota systems and other extraordinary devices for the limitation of imports, and to new and increased tariffs which protected uneconomic industries developed during war years for the production of goods that, under normal conditions, it was cheaper to import. The desire to conserve scanty resources increased the effort to produce at home, rather than to import, not only manufactured goods, but food supplies. Industrial and agricultural countries were alike affected by these developments. Unemployment mounted.

In the defeated nations, the burden of debt led to a degree of inflation which made their currencies worthless and eliminated them as customers in the world market. In the Allied countries, where the need was for painstaking efforts at reconstruction, the hysterical war habit of spending without counting resources or costs could not be suddenly changed. The hopes of the people, encouraged by governments, were centered on the receipt of reparations. Government expenditures continued far to exceed reduced national revenues. There were four possible methods by which budgets might have been balanced: (1) by greatly increasing taxation, but this was not politically expedient; (2) by curtailing expenditures, but the demands of the veterans and the

needs of the people made this impracticable; (3) by agreeing to receive reparation payments in goods since they could not be paid in gold, but this, aside from the undesired effect on the enemy countries, would have interfered with home industry; and (4) by inflating the currency, which was done. It is to be noted that, though governments may hesitate to take the savings of their people by taxation, they nevertheless consume them by inflation.

It was not until some five years after the war that European governments struggled back to the gold standard, and then on a basis, except in England, of currencies so reduced in value that the whole credit system suffered heavily. Added to all this, governments, continuing to think in terms of war, kept up expenditures for armaments, in amounts much greater than before the war, and thereby froze large sums of money in unproductive equipment.

As for the United States, blinded by the rapidity of the changes of war years, it failed to recognize the shift in its position from a debtor to a creditor nation. This change in its financial relationship logically called for increased imports. But to have lowered tariffs and thus admitted European goods—which were being produced at low prices because of depreciated currencies—when its own industries and agriculture had been over-developed to meet the domestic and foreign demand during war years, would have meant strong political opposition from

the groups affected. Far from making any such adjustment, the United States raised its tariffs.

Depreciated currencies and increased tariffs became the weapons of an economic war in which governments continued to promote, as they had in the actual war, less the general welfare of their own people than the injury of others.

The vicious circle of depreciated currencies and tariffs grows out of the fact that money decreases in value somewhat more rapidly than wages rise, and that it is, therefore, possible for a country with a depreciated currency to produce goods at a lower cost. For instance, if the daily wage in a country which depreciates its currency is ten francs, and employers continue, for some time, to pay ten francs, although each franc after depreciating is worth only seventeen cents, say, instead of twenty cents, the cost of producing goods is reduced by that much. The country with depreciated currency has the advantage of being able to reduce the price of its exports. Other countries, to protect themselves against this competition, raise their tariffs. The country with depreciated currency loses its advantage until its currency further depreciates—and so on indefinitely.

So little was the real situation understood that the whole problem appeared to be solved when, a few years after the peace settlement, large sums of the surplus capital which had been accumulating in the United States began to be invested abroad, making

reparation payments possible and also the purchase of American goods. But because, under the conditions that existed, production profitable enough to repay the loans and interest was impossible, what this actually amounted to was that American citizens made the reparation payments and paid themselves for the goods they shipped abroad. With a steady rise in the stocks of American industries and with a growing realization of the true condition of European countries, the tide of capital suddenly turned away from European investments to speculation in America. The illusion of world recovery was shattered.

The collapse came just ten years after the "peace settlement" in which governments had laid down their guns, only to continue the use of weapons of far greater destructive power.

Following the financial crash in 1929, prices dropped rapidly, many of them in less than three years, to below the pre-war level; by 1932 agricultural prices in the United States fell to less than half and industrial security prices to one-third. More than half the countries of the world were again forced off the gold standard, the only existing common standard of value; twenty-four countries declared some form of debt moratorium. Twenty-three countries arbitrarily and suddenly—allowing no time for adjustment—further raised their tariffs; in less than three years the value of world trade declined

by two-thirds; world stocks accumulated until the quantity of basic commodities was two and one-half times as great in 1932 as in 1925. Wages in the United States fell from \$53,000,000,000 in 1929 to \$28,000,000,000 in 1932; the national income of the United States dropped over 50 per cent during the same period. More than 13,000,000 workers were unemployed in the United States at the beginning of 1933—it is estimated that in the world more than 30,000,000 had no employment—and in consequence many more millions of men, women and children were without means of support. The earnings of corporate enterprises in the United States fell, between 1929 and 1931, 160 per cent of the 1928 level. The owners of businesses and investors lost more than \$70,000,000,000. The loss in wages and salaries to men and women workers was more than \$37,000,000,000.

More than 900,000 American farm families, according to government figures, were turned out of their homes through foreclosure of mortgages. The amount of money lost through failure of banks is estimated by the Comptroller of the Treasury to have been between \$2,000,000,000 and \$3,000,000,000. In April, 1934, there were 16,700,000 men and women on the government relief rolls. Up to the middle of the fifth year of the depression, June, 1934, the total emergency expenditures of the Federal government amounted to \$6,452,846,304. The sum expended in direct unemployment and farm relief

was \$3,642,000,000. Various forms of collateral and assets back a large part of these expenditures but taxation must cover \$2,750,000,000, which amounts to \$22.30 per capita. Recent studies of economists place the total post-war cost of the World War to the United States at \$200,000,000,000.

There is yet another disastrous economic consequence of war. The problems arising from the economic developments of recent years, mass production, the spread of industrialization throughout the world, the introduction of new sources of power and raw materials, the mechanization of agriculture, the increasing displacement of man power by mechanical power, challenge the full attention of statesmen. War not only turns attention away from these problems but accelerates their development and makes impossible the adjustments and control which might be possible in normal times.

The chaos produced by the last war has dangerously intensified existing economic problems and made their gradual and peaceful solution extremely difficult. There is no question in the mind of any informed person that what possibility there is of such a solution depends upon the avoidance of further world conflict.

Only ignorance or wilful deception can prolong the present situation in which governments claim to seek the prosperity of their people but fail to make the abolition of war their first concern.

CHAPTER VI

BECAUSE IN WAR YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT
YOU ARE FIGHTING FOR

EMILY NEWELL BLAIR

"The more I study the world, the more I am convinced
of the inability of brute force to create anything durable."

NAPOLEON I.

ONE lovely night last summer eight women from eight different countries sat on my lanai in a Honolulu hotel—notable women, distinguished women, clear thinkers, leaders of women. As such women invariably do when they get together, these women were expressing their abhorrence of war. Strange, the unanimity of opinion among them: Japanese, Chinese, East Indian, Australian, Canadian, New Zealander, Fiji Islander, Korean, American. That war was extravagant and brutal, that it was suicidal for the nations which essayed it, that even the winner suffered catastrophic after effects, all agreed.

And then one woman said, "I will not endorse any war. I will go to jail first. It is the only way to make statesmen abandon war as a method. If they can't make people fight, they won't resort to war."

One by one the other women agreed with her. All, that is, save one. "I will stay out of any war," said the woman, "except a war of defense. If my country should be attacked, I could not fail her."

What this woman should have said was, "I will support any war that comes along!" Not that she believes in war as a method of settling disputes. She doesn't. She is as ardent an advocate of peace as anyone. But she does not face facts. Every war, after it begins, is a war of defense. Trust statesmen and politicians for that! Were not the German soldiers in the last war fighting to keep the Russian soldiers from tramping over the Fatherland? Were not the French soldiers fighting to keep the German soldiers from Paris? Didn't English women firmly believe their men were defending their country from what a victorious Germany would do to their little island once Germans commanded the Channel ports? Didn't Americans believe, thousands of them, that if Germany was victorious her next step would be New York? If any of them did not, it was not because they were not told so.

Now, twenty years after that war, when we read the books that are written about it—books written by scholars who have dug into the records, by the diplomats who either made the war or allowed it to happen, by the generals who fought the war, the propagandists who sold it to their countrymen,—we do not find a single word about a war of defense. In the preparation of this article I have read some

twenty books to discover what really caused that war. Not that I discovered the answer—at least any answer that can be set down inside the limits of this article. Trade rivalries, fears and counter-fears, national prejudices and prides all played their part. But two things, at least, I did discover. The first was that, through all the diplomatic prelude which stretched over years, the threat of war and the fear of war were the dominating motifs. The second was that the explanations which were handed out to the nationals of the various countries as to the cause of the war bore an amazing similarity to each other. In the peace negotiations of 1916 President Wilson took "the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world."

Yet I should not, after all, have been astonished at the similarity. Men today, the world over, are pretty much alike. There are only a few things, a very few, for which they will fight a war. Naturally, then, if you want to make them fight, you must make them think they are fighting for these things. Since defense of their country has the widest appeal, they can be more quickly roused to fight for that than anything else. Ergo, they are told they are fighting for defense. They are told it not only in the words of the recruiting placards—"Your country needs you"—but they are told it in a thousand insidious

ways, by imaginary tales about the atrocities the enemy commits against women, children and civilians, by speeches distorting history, by editorials and distorted or planted news dispatches. Was not the letter disclosing that Herr Zimmerman planned to get Mexico on the German side, with a promise to restore to it the lost province of Texas, given out through British agencies at just the right time to be, as Senator Lodge said, "of almost unlimited use in forcing the situation?"

We should not blame war propagandists unduly. After all, the war is sold to them, too. They believe in it and, believing in it, want to win it. War has no ethics. Anything is justifiable that wins it. Did not Lord Bryce, when asked why he had sponsored the Bryce Commission on Atrocities, which purported to have investigated 1,200 cases and has since been proved entirely untrustworthy, defend it by saying, "One may expect anything in war time?"

How far could any country get in waging a war if its statesmen announced to the country: "Our markets are in peril. If we want to keep them we must put this other country out of business." Or this: "Some of your fellow citizens own oil in our enemy's country. That country wants to shut them out, so we must fight to make them let your fellow citizens who want that oil have it." Or: "Our enemy owes some of our citizens money. It refuses to pay, so you must fight that country to force it to pay." No war could ever be waged, or won, or even begun,

for calmly stated reasons such as these. Yet wars are fought for just such causes.

Not that it is quite so simple as this. Before war actually comes there are usually a lot of tangled circumstances. So entangled are they that often it takes ten years to disentangle them and discover what actually did cause the war. Sometimes the causes of a war are so successfully scrambled by politicians and diplomats, that historians can never agree upon the causes. In the meantime, men die in these wars by the millions for some publicized reason that has nothing to do with the real cause of the conflict. Usually, since this is the easiest reason to sell, the publicized reason is "defense of their country."

Some people never do learn the real causes of the war they fought. These causes, when discovered, are not publicized by posters or stump speeches, or printed under headlines in newspapers. They are contained in books, serious books, usually written by scholars and well documented. Only a few people read them. Others go on thinking the war was fought for the reasons given at the time. These reasons are passed on in textbooks. They become accepted as facts. For example: of the wars fought by our country, only one, and that only by a stretch of logic, could be called defensive—the war of the American Revolution. Yet ask the average man or the average schoolboy about them! He will tell you they were all defensive wars.

I am not here attacking wars of conquest, as such. In times past, men were willing to risk their lives in quest of new lands, new opportunities. In Elizabethan days they were quite frank about it. If they won a war, the victorious soldiers had the right to loot. When Sir Francis Drake overhauled a Spanish ship or Sir Walter Raleigh conquered a South American tribe, even the queen herself took a share of the booty. Some men today are doubtless willing to do likewise. They would not mind in the least setting out to win a new land where they might find an oil well or a diamond mine. Whether or not they would be equally willing to protect the oil well for the Standard Oil Company is another question. But wars today are fought on a vaster scale than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A few freebooters and men at arms cannot win them. To do so requires a large army, a great expenditure of money for armament. No war today could be fought or financed merely by those who are interested in conquest. It would require the help of others who can only be won to fight the war by the belief that it is a defensive war. Hence the necessity of selling wars to people as defensive wars. Hence the reams of publicity to that effect.

That there could conceivably some day be such a thing as a defensive war is not, of course, entirely impossible. But the point is this: How, in view of the fact that wars of conquest for the benefit of a few are presented as defensive wars, is one to know

a purely defensive war when he sees it? Mayn't he go on fighting wars of conquest sold to him as defensive wars without ever really waging a defensive war?

The question then becomes: Is it sensible to go and be killed to protect someone's oil wells and make profits for the munition makers on the bare chance that this may prove to be the one-in-a-hundred defensive war? Isn't that a rather wild gamble to take? Would it not be more sensible to say that any institution that involves such odds ought to be scrapped and some method which cannot be so easily and successfully employed by those who profit from the conquests be substituted in its place?

The very words "defensive war" are a solecism. The word "war" was devised to express "attack." This is indicated by our use of it. You can say, "We make war, we go to war, we fight a war." It is a contradiction in terms to say, "We make war to defend ourselves from war." The moment you make war you try to win,—when you try to win you are no longer on the defensive, you have taken the offensive.

The time to prevent a war is when the first causes of it are set in motion. But this is difficult. Even those who set them in motion frequently do not know that they are doing it. Sir Arthur Nicolson, for example, when he so proudly promoted the *entente cordiale* had no idea that in time to come his own son would pronounce this accomplishment to be

one of the steps which led ultimately to the World War. Sir Edward Grey, who loved peace, could not foresee when he made his secret promises to France and Russia that they would force him some day to make a speech in the House of Commons urging England to go to war over Belgian neutrality. Similarly, when an industrialist insists that the State Department protect his rights to an oil field in Manchukuo, or a banker insists that it protest the repudiation of bonds owed him, he does not really, I believe, mean to provoke a world war or even involve his own country in a serious war. He probably expects the marines to take care of it and thinks that, after all, they are paid to fight.

But from such beginnings wars develop. No war ever just happens. No man, nor even a group of wicked men, sits down and says, "Now, when such and such a country is weak and our chance comes, we will attack it and take what we want." At least, they seldom do today. Something is done which develops a situation. Other acts add fuel to it. It slowly grows more inflammable. A spark finally sets it afire and there is war. A bad nation does not, out of a clear sky, attack one which wants to be good. Both are to blame somewhere along the line. Which one sets off the first gun is likely to be more or less accident.

We still think, alas, of war in terms of the old tribal raid. We talk about aggressor and culprit, defense and offense, yet war today is not at all like a

border raid. It springs from a psychological situation. Unfortunately, instead of calling in a psychiatrist, we still employ the methods of tribal warfare.

In the days of the tribal raid, men and women did at least know who was invader and who defender. Both did not claim to be defenders. The attackers knew they were attackers and probably proclaimed it with shouts meant to terrify the attacked. The others had no doubts about being put on the defensive. They needed no publicity agents to persuade them that they were.

But we today are often so far from the real beginnings of the conflict that the moment to stop it may easily pass before we know it is there. Sometimes we do know. Sometimes, too, we can even stop the conflict before it is too late. There was, for example, the historic case of the oil situation in January, 1927. The newspapers indicated we were slipping toward war with Mexico. Under its new constitution, Mexico had passed certain laws pertaining to mineral lands. Immediately Americans subject to these laws interested our State Department, which held that these laws were "confiscatory of the property rights of our citizens." The President of Mexico declared his willingness to arbitrate. Our President through his official spokesman took the position that "confiscation of unalienable property rights of citizens cannot be arbitrated." The counsel for certain American oil interests said publicly they were willing to carry the issue to a point of war if necessary.

Certain newspapers clamored for a break with Mexico. Other newspapers, fortunately, took a more pacific attitude. Advocates of peace were at once aroused. Through its president, organized labor appealed in the press for peace. Dr. Cadman made a similar plea in behalf of the churches. An appeal signed by 450 leaders in all walks of life was carried by the press of the entire country. A technical exposition of one hundred and one professors of international law and political science in forty-three universities and colleges was published. Representatives of thirty organizations, official and unofficial, met in Washington to consider possibilities of joint action. Telegrams, letters and petitions poured in to the President's office. Senator Borah came out for arbitration. Democratic Senate leaders joined him. On January 25th the Robinson Resolution calling for arbitration was passed by the Senate by a vote of seventy-nine to nothing.

And what were the oil interests which had started all this trouble? Investigation revealed that, of the 666 foreign oil companies in Mexico which own 28,500,000 acres, all but twenty-two companies, claiming rights to 1,600,000 acres, had complied with the Mexican law, and these 1,600,000 acres were largely owned and wholly controlled by one man, Edward L. Doheny. So a war to protect Mr. Doheny's Mexican interests was avoided.

Sometimes, too, public servants are big enough to stop war. A few years before the South African war

some British forces were defeated at Majuba. The cry went up all over England that no defeat of British forces could be accepted. Gladstone, then premier, looking into the matter, discovered that the British position was mistaken. Whereupon he ordered conciliation and peace.

But not always is the situation so clear-cut as these, not always are there people as alert and ready as were certain groups in regard to the Mexican situation of 1927, or big enough to defy a popular outcry as was Gladstone in the South African situation.

In 1898 the United States went to war with Spain over Cuba. There were any number of places where this war might have been stopped. To name but one, when Congress passed the \$50,000,000 appropriation for national defense which, in the words of Walter Millis, made it evident that "a stupid, vindictive, and desperate public opinion in Spain would certainly compel us to defend ourselves." There were statesmen then working to stop this war; even the President himself was a man of peace. But evidently they could not combat the forces working for it—the people aroused to war heat by the sinking of the *Maine*, the politicians' fear of the public will, the jingoes who wanted a chance to fight, the investors who wanted redress for lost capital, the others who wanted protection of their investments, the imperialists who wanted to see America a great world power and the money center of the world. Perhaps the diffi-

culty was that there were so many forces that no single one could be isolated and shown up by those who wanted peace. And so war was declared, even *after*—and this is to be noticed—*after* Spain had acceded to every request put forward by the United States. As Walter Millis put it in "The Martial Spirit," writing of the President's message to Congress, "The fact that Spain had surrendered was imparted in two brief paragraphs, inserted at the end of nine closely printed pages written on the assumption that she had not."

The avowed object of this war was the liberation of Cuba. But tucked away in the President's message to Congress was a reference to the fact that American trade had suffered and the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba had been largely lost. American investments in Cuba amounted to over \$50,000,000—a large sum then; the trade of the United States with the island reached a value of \$100,000,000; American claims amounted to over \$16,000,000.

It is not asserted that the United States went to war only because of these things. Yet it is safe to say that, had the amounts been less than half as much, this war would likely never have been fought. Not that the legislature of Iowa, which appropriated \$500,000 as a defense fund, or the boys in the fever-haunted camps, knew this.

Certain policies of our industrialists in out-of-the-way places today are sowing the seeds of similar wars of economic conquest. Publicists to tell us so

are not lacking, as witness Ludwell Denny's book, "We Fight for Oil," in which the author shows how our State Department has fought the British Government in every oil-bearing corner of the earth to bring final control of the world markets to American rather than British capital, and predicts that, when an American oil shortage approaches, anti-British propaganda can be evoked by oil interests.

"Ridiculous," one may say. "What! waste a single boy's life to pay for our joy rides!" It is more serious than that. The navies of the world depend upon oil for fuel. Control of oil is control of fuel. But here again one comes upon one of the fallacies of modern war. When a business asks its government to protect its interests, the assumption is that it is for the national good to help those interests. Thus, the American people could easily be made to feel that national security depends upon American capital controlling the oil markets. If American capital was actually abroad seeking oil for our use in case of war, we might then feel that the interests involved were worth fighting for. But what is the fact? As Mr. Denny brilliantly makes clear, the price of getting control of the oil for use in war is to go to war to get the oil. It seems fantastic but it is true. It is on a par with the oft-repeated prophecy that the struggle for a so-called commercial supremacy will promote a war between the countries seeking supremacy which will end in the destruction of both. A rather large price to pay, it would seem, for the

privilege of struggling. What is actually meant is that you gamble the lives of your sons to save your dollars with a sixty to fifty chance, or more, of losing both.

What is true of oil is true to an extent of rubber, tin, chemicals. A fight for world control of the sources of these commodities is on. President Wilson once said that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry. Charles M. Schwab, chairman of the Board of the Bethlehem Steel Company, once went even further by announcing, "There never was a war that did not spring from commerce, with selfish trade motives at the bottom of it." The ancients apparently agreed with him. In Sanscrit the word for war means "*We want more cows.*"

That war does not get what it starts out to get does not stop men from resorting to war to get it. As Norman Angell once pointed out, England was supposed to go to war to save its markets from German competition; it won the war, but what markets did it win?

It is fashionable now to talk of the "economic" causes of war and "economic" wars. "Economic needs, economic necessity" are invoked as if by explaining an act they also excused it, as if men were mere pygmies in the control of these forces whose will men must do. In such an attitude is danger. For we may come to be swayed as emotionally by "economic necessity" as we have heretofore been by a

superstitious worship of national honor. So-called "economic wars" may be just as un-economic as the religious wars of the sixteenth century were unreligious. Economy, as Salvador de Madariaga once pointed out, means "the science of the best husbandry of world resources from the point of view of man. When economic arguments are invoked to defend action hurtful to men, it is un-economic." The true cause, as he further said, "of so-called economic rivalries for world power is a lust for power on the part of individuals." Today such individuals seek economic power as once men sought political power.

To win the wealth which today is power these men lend money to foreign powers, they seek to exploit the natural resources of backward countries, to win the markets of other countries, to gain financial control of other countries. This alone, however, could never lead to war. What leads to war is that they ask their own government—our government—to protect them in these endeavors, to help them collect their debts from foreign countries, to get special protection for them, independent of the laws and customs of the countries in which the investments are made. They induce governments to impose economic handicaps on backward countries, to direct their foreign policy so as to secure concessions for them, or tariff preferentials. Yet this we must remember: governments would not do what these men ask unless they themselves had an illusion that

it meant power for their country, nor would citizens permit it if they did not share this illusion. These interests, as Norman Angell once said, are like the munition makers whose willingness to promote wars and take profits regardless of national boundaries has lately been exposed to public view. They profit by exploiting certain fallacies in the public mind—what has been called our "facile credulity." As long as we remain in possession of these fallacies, these special interests will find it easy to exploit them and, when their actions produce a war, lead us into it.

For example, if anyone asked us outright if we would sacrifice American lives to collect private debts, we would assuredly say no. No one asks us that. They talk about the "defense of our international rights." If anyone asked us to help him put a foreign competitor out of business, we would certainly refuse. But no one asks us that. They appeal to us to defend our commercial markets against the "insidious, nefarious, despicable efforts" of another country to steal them.

True patriotism is possibly the highest expression of alter-egoism men have reached. But, alas, if played upon adroitly it can so easily be exploited to make us fight sordid commercial wars under the impression that we are defending our country against a foreign invader.

What, then, if we cannot know what we are fighting for, can we do to keep ourselves from fighting? There is only one sensible thing to do. Abolish war

as a method of settling international difficulties—any wars of any kind, so-called defensive wars along with the rest. Once war is not an alternative, other methods will be found for the adjustment of difficulties. More than that, once war is not the final arbitrament, industrialists, bankers, or any other economic conquistadors will find other ways to play their game. So long as it is, we will find ourselves fighting the “defensive wars” which grow out of that game.

To inveigh, in the meantime, against these men is to waste our breath and also, it must be confessed, be foolishly inconsistent. After all, they do no more than play their game according to the rules of the game up to date. By permitting war to be the last resort when nations disagree, by permitting ourselves to be sold on a war of defense, we put war as the ace of trumps into their hands.

CHAPTER VII

BECAUSE WARS UNLEASH DEMORALIZING INSTINCTS

JUDGE FLORENCE E. ALLEN

“We may well ask ourselves whether civilization does not really reach a point where it begins to destroy itself and whether we are doomed to go headlong down through destructive war and darkness to barbarism.”

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING.

It is my purpose to discuss here not only the effect of war upon those who make war—most of them infinitely more sinned against than sinning—but also upon the entire civilian group. Crime indeed does follow and is the obvious result of war. But the callousness, cynicism, greed and materialism fostered in the nations as a whole by the unleashing of the war spirit send their deadly germs coursing throughout the entire human organism. Broken families are the result of war. The loss of social self-control, both in government, in business and in industry, is fed by war. Increase in open crime in fact, dangerous as it may be, is the easiest and simplest phase of the post-war epoch.

In its report on the causes of crime the National

Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement says, "The soundest data on crime causation seems to have been contributed by the literature which has studied the criminal in terms of the demoralizing social influences which have acted upon him," and lists among those influences:

- (1) Contact with adult demoralizing patterns of behavior, and
- (2) Failure of the family to function effectively as a social educator.

The Great War, in common with every war, gave the men in service contact with demoralizing patterns of behavior, and increased the failure of the family to function as a social educator, thus directing the race into channels of criminal activity.

Perhaps this is harsh language. But when we consider, as Philip Gibbs suggests, the long nagging of the war upon the nervous system until it was all worn and frayed, the high tension of war excitement which suddenly snapped when the Armistice was signed, and the subconscious effect of war's liberating influences upon the moral restraints of civilized nature, the language is not too strong. It is true, as Gibbs says, that in the war acts which constitute the major crimes in peace times had been for four and a half years the work of life, the purpose of life. The everyday work of the soldier consisted in performing the very deeds, including the killing of men, which under every civilized code constitute the major felonies.

The most brilliant and sensitive man that I ever knew, after returning from his service in France, said to his mother, during the illness of which he died, "All that you have taught me the world says is not so." We cannot abolish the entire code of ethics for millions of men, for their families, for the nations from which they come and then suddenly order those men, those families, those nations, to revert to that ethical code and expect them all to comply. And so it was that many observers besides Philip Gibbs were startled not only by the rapid decline in morality which coincided with the war, but still more by the lowering of spiritual ideals after the Armistice. They had had faith that men and nations would come through the trial refined as in a fire. There was growing consternation when they saw the gradual increase in immorality and the laxity of relationship between men and women. As time went on they also saw that crimes displayed a callousness and cruelty not noticeable before the war.

In an article on the moral value of war, George Wheeler Hinman, Jr., says that the moral value of war for the soldier was that he got from it "the will to win, the strength to endure, the courage to die," and that through all three of these runs the fibre of discipline. Whatever of these qualities was displayed in the war was brought with them to the war by men of all nations, by men of our nation. Whatever discipline was taught in the war was the discipline of command and fear and not the discipline of self-

control. And so when the discipline was relaxed the explosion came.

The delinquency among ex-soldiers was soon recognized both abroad and in America.

Philip Gibbs, in "Now It Can Be Told," written in 1920, says:

"For there are diseases and insanity in our present state, due to the travail of the war and the education of the war. The daily newspapers for many months have been filled with the record of dreadful crimes of violence and passion. Most of them have been done by soldiers or ex-soldiers. The attack on the police station at Epsom, the destruction of the town hall at Luton, revealed a brutality of passion, a murderous instinct, which have been manifested again and again in other riots and street rows and solitary crimes. These last are the worst because they are not inspired by a sense of injustice, however false, or by any mob passion, but by homicidal mania and secret lust. The many murders of young women, the outrages since the demobilizing of the armies, have appalled decent-minded people. They cannot understand the cause of this epidemic after a period when there was less crime than usual.

"The cause is easy to understand. It is caused by the discipline and training of modern warfare. Our armies, as all armies, established an intensive culture of brutality."

In America an article appeared in *Mental Hygiene* written in 1923 by W. F. Lorenz, M.D., Director of the Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute. Dr. Lorenz said, "in 1922 it was estimated that approx-

imately 20,000 ex-service men were in penal institutions throughout the United States. This seemed an unusually large number." Dr. Lorenz then applies the figures in Wisconsin to the figures in the United States in the ratio of Wisconsin's quota in the army, and adds, "The estimate of 20,000 ex-service men in penal institutions of the country is corroborated by our findings in Wisconsin.

"This is an abnormal situation. The incidence of criminality is far above that ordinarily found in the civilian population for the age group concerned, that is, males ranging from 19 to 31."

Dr. Lorenz goes on to explain the increase in criminality, at least partly, in this way:

"We wish to stress a certain disregard of property rights that we personally observed in the military service, especially overseas. Clothing and equipment were government property. They were assigned to an individual but were not regarded by the soldier as individual property. To help oneself whenever in need was a common practice, particularly overseas, and with active divisions large amounts of property became salvage dumps. For a soldier to help himself to necessary equipment from such salvage piles was generally sanctioned. The property rights of organizations in equipment were commonly disregarded. A shortage was often made up by stealing from a nearby organization and not infrequently with the knowledge of the commanding officers. Property became still more a matter of mere taking as the troops engaged in battle. The influence of such an experience commonly practised and occasionally sanc-

tioned by those in authority was not conducive to respecting property rights at home. A normal mind, of course, is expected to adjust itself to widely different situations of war and peace. But the relatively immature mind might easily be influenced by such practices, or the young soldier, lacking in good character, because of the absence of favorable home influences during childhood, might be looked upon as having received a pernicious moral twist from such experiences."

The statistics given in the United States Department of Commerce figures from the Bureau of Census ("Prisoners for 1923") show that for the years from 1910 to 1923 there was the following increase in crime percentages:

Forgery	68.2
Homicide	16.1
Rape	33.3
Violating Drug Laws	2,006.7
Robbery	83.3

The figures on robbery seem particularly significant. Here is a combination of the disregard for property of which Dr. Lorenz speaks, together with the violence engendered by war. Robbery is the taking of property by force and violence or by putting in fear. Immediately after the demobilization, when the boys came back and the jobs that had been promised them did not materialize and they walked the streets hunting for work, it was perhaps not so unnatural that they had the same feeling that they had had in the army, that they could take the thing

they needed from the general supply and if necessary take it by force and violence. So the courts too often saw soldiers in khaki charged with robbery and similar crimes.

It is true, as stated by Thorsten Sellin, that prison statistics represent an insignificant fraction of recorded criminality and one which depends upon variable factors. It is, as he says, one thing to determine the guilt of the defendant and another thing to determine the existence of a certain crime even though the criminal may be unknown. However, these statistics of robbery, based upon the men in prisons in 1923, if anything are too limited. Undoubtedly robberies occurred for which convictions were never imposed.

During this period there was a distinct increase in homicides in the United States. Now homicides come within the class of crimes which, as pointed out by Sellin, are greatly injurious to the social welfare, public in nature and of such a kind that they induce the fullest possible coöperation between the victim or those interested in him and the agency of law enforcement. Bearing in mind that in the United States, owing to the fact that the chief agency for administering justice with reference to the usual felonies is the state, and not the United States, and that therefore the statistics of crimes in this country are infinitely less complete than in the British Isles, Canada or Germany, it is all-important that the rate per thousand in the registration area of the

Bureau of the Census in homicides rose from 6.0% in 1915 to 9.2% in 1932.

The mere increase in these figures, moreover, does not begin to tell the story. A marked feature of this period has been the youth of the criminal and the unusual cruelty of the crimes committed. This element of cruelty had been noticed during the war. Laurence Housman tells the following incident:

"A party of English soldiers was out foraging behind the firing-line in a French village. They came to a small farm, wanting to buy butter and eggs. The farmer asked an exorbitant price, more than they were able to pay. Going away they met some engineers, and told them what had happened; they wished they could pay the farmer out. The engineers, willing to oblige, ran up a signal flag in close proximity to the farm; and in an hour the farm was shot down into ruin by the German guns—merely because the owner had asked too high a price for his butter and eggs."

An even more cogent story is found in Brigadier-General Crozier's "A Brass Hat in No Man's Land."

"A British N. C. O. had been bullying some of his subordinates. As there appeared to be no way of dealing with the case, the aggrieved men decided to deal with the matter in their own way. As the essence of the crime, from the criminal's point of view, is to leave no trace, they decided to get rid of their tormentor in the manner which they thought most suited to that purpose.

"A Mills bomb has a local but very violent explosive effect. They decided that the Mills bomb should

therefore be their agent. They caught their victim bending so to speak. Pulling out the pin from the bomb which held the lever in check and which, in its turn, ignited the charge which exploded after the lapse of some seconds, one of them—they had previously drawn lots for the job—pushed the bomb down and back of the N. C. O.'s trousers after which they made off at lightning speed to avoid the explosion.

"Fortunately the poor man was isolated and entirely alone or others would have been killed—but he, ignorant till too late of what had happened, was, figuratively speaking, hoisted to glory by his own petard, for he, of course, became a battle casualty."

The abnormality and neurotic features of the crimes which burst out in England after the war have been pointed out by Philip Gibbs. In this country the Hickman case, the Loeb and Leopold case, and similar crimes, were thus characterized by H. C. Brearley, in his book on "Homicide in the United States":

"Shortly after the close of the World War there was a marked increase in sensational murders committed by mere youths, such as the notable Hickman case and the Loeb and Leopold case. By many these slayings were attributed to the disorganization following in the wake of war. For example, Dr. A. A. Brill, a psychiatrist, presented in an interview the theory that such homicides were due primarily to the failure to develop the proper inhibitions in those who were children during the period of the war. 'Emotions,' he says 'have not changed, do not change.

Every child is a little criminal! He becomes law abiding only when we have grafted inhibitions—do-nots—upon his impressionable mind.' During the war years parents were unable to create an aversion to slaying in the minds of their children, especially in the minds of those who were emotionally undeveloped or infantile. 'The boys who are killing now were seven, eight, nine and ten then. They waged mimic wars with tin soldiers and they chose for hero-worship the man who had brought down fifteen enemy planes, who had bayoneted twenty foemen in a bull rush across to the waiting trench. One inhibition was swept away . . . when a nation which held murder in horror suddenly broke out in sturdy anthems of praise for killers and killing.' Dr. Brill believes, furthermore, that 'the psychological effects of the World War will not wear off in at least another fifty years.' "

With reference to the youth of the criminal, Richard Washburn Child, in his book on "The Battling of the Criminal," says:

"My astonishment is great at the sincerity, the vehemence, the conviction of judges, wardens, prosecutors, police chiefs, patrolmen, detectives, old professional criminals with whom I have talked, and with citizens who are writing me from various corners of the United States. Their voice is one voice. It says, 'The old criminal is outdone: today the criminal population, which probably numbers in excess of a million, is made up in large part of girls and boys.' "

Mr. Child quotes an ex-warden of Sing Sing to the effect that more than half of the criminals today are

twenty-four or younger, and a famous New York prosecutor to the effect that eight out of ten criminals are in their teens or in their twenties.

The crimes committed by these young boys and girls, of course, cannot be laid to the fact that they took part in war service. They are evidence of the fact that the war neurosis was not limited to soldiers in the field. It spread throughout their families. From the family it spread throughout the entire civilian population and corrupted the growing boy and girl. When the soldier was retired he was in an abnormal state of mind, and he was received into an abnormal society. It was a society which had violently thrown off the old taboos, and the children of that day felt the relaxation of ethical restraint.

Nowhere was this social off-balance more plain than in the post-war sex craze—a craze which directly attacked the solidarity of the family. It had existed in all armies during the war. As Brigadier-General Crozier says, "The abnormal life, the shattered nerves, the longing to forget, if even for one brief moment, the absence from home, and the inculcation of barbaric habits in our manhood . . . lead directly and inevitably to the path of free love on a large, elaborate and ever-expanding scale.

"It is a fact that prostitutes and loose women always follow the big drum."

As General Crozier was told by a woman friend of his at Boulogne, "The morals of many of the men have disappeared, while the girls have become war

mad and sex mad. In many cases these go together and free love is easy."

Crozier states that at Brussels after the Armistice there was an orgy of vice in which many British soldiers joined. The official statistics of one of the armies at the front give 400,000 cases of venereal disease.

This looseness in morality at the front had a direct repercussion at home. Philip Gibbs gives figures showing that in 1920 there were ten times as many divorces as there had been in England before the war. The mounting toll of divorces in this country need only be mentioned. The *Literary Digest*, in 1921, headlined to the world that America leads the world in divorce.

Benjamin P. Chass, in the *New York Times Current History Magazine* (1925), states: "In 1890 there was one divorce for every 16 marriages, whereas in 1923 there was recorded one divorce for 7.5 marriages, an increase of approximately 125 per cent, in thirty-three years."

The figures for divorce per 100 marriages, as given in the *World Almanac*, show an increase from 10.6% in 1917 to 16.3% in 1932.

It is true, of course, that other causes affect the increase in divorce throughout the world and in this country. Also some of the increase in divorce is rational and justified. However, the irresponsibility engendered by the war had a direct bearing upon easy divorce and the breakup of the family. Entirely

apart from the emotional instability fostered by the "free love" doctrine, after the war marriage was apt to be a drudgery. To a man who had had the thrill, the adventure of going over the top, settling down to ordinary life with an ordinary woman in an ordinary home, surrounded by an ordinary family, was drab and humdrum. And so, after the war, the relationship with his own wife and children, which should have stimulated the ex-service man to proper social adjustment, was often lacking. That functioning of the family as a social educator, which the National Crime Commission so rightly calls "the first bulwark of the state against crime," to a considerable extent became impossible.

Also the older members of the soldier's family were demoralized. They felt the injustice and the inequality of the burden that they had borne, with profiteers running riot, war workers making exorbitant wages while the boys were in the trenches. There was no conscription of wealth. Millionaires multiplied in every warring country while every family whose sons saw service was making, in addition to the other greater sacrifices, an enormous financial sacrifice. When the men came home the nation that had stood in line cheering them gave them not even work to do. And many of them did not come home. Parents who had boys at the front resented the special privilege, the injustice of the system, with a resentment that to this day cuts deep into every fiber. Those who had no boys at the front, the war workers

and the profiteers were even more corrupted. Those who benefit by a corrupt system always suffer disintegration most. The master really deteriorates more than the slave. Through the whole civilian population materialism ran rampant after the war. Materialism had led to the war and now the war fastened materialism upon the entire civilian population. It was shown in graft and corruption in high office, it contributed directly to the building up of banditry and the racket; people worn with the long anxiety went out to secure themselves materially. And the race for speculative profits, for mergers, for combinations, for bonuses, for all of the vicious methods and advantages of mere financial gain was on in all its heat.

It was then, with the breakup of the home, the materialism of life, the apathy toward public questions, the disregard of integrity, both in private and in public life, that organized crime received its mighty impetus. Gault, in his book on criminology and penology, states that in the autumn of 1927 some fifty rackets were uncovered, while by April, 1928, 117 separate rackets had been identified. Henry Barrett Chamberlin, director of the Chicago Crime Commission, stated in 1931 that the operations of organized criminals extend into many different fields, and their methods of professional violence include all sorts of shocking and cruel activities, such as terrorization by bombs. Bombing today, he points out, has become a vocation practiced by specialized

crews or gangs, who serve as paid retainers in any cause requiring their services, and he concludes that, while in the numerous cases that have focussed public attention on organized crime the criminal has not always been identified, "enough information has developed to convince reasonable people that crime during the last decade has been organized on a scale and with reserves unprecedented in the world's history." The very man in the street knows that there have been twenty-nine major cases of kidnapping, dating from the abduction and murder of the Lindbergh baby in March, 1932, and the kidnapping map covers the entire country.

It was natural that some of the men in service who had contact with "adult demoralizing patterns of behavior," and lacked the advantage of social and family restraint, should take on the pattern of the army from which they had come—its organization, its cohesiveness, its blind obedience, its *esprit de corps*.

It was natural that they should use the technical skill acquired in the army and turn the machine gun and the bomb to criminal purposes. And some of them did so.

In "Recent Social Trends," the most authentic discussion of social tendencies ever made in the United States, Sutherland points out that the racket and extortion and kidnapping are the most significant of the newer forms of crime. He also lists among the

historical facts that are distinctly related to the crime situation in this country, the "World War." Hornell Hart, in the same authority, discussing "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," says that religious sanctions have largely disappeared since 1900 in discussions published in leading magazines, and particularly stresses the fact that sexual irregularities, easy divorce and sex freedom in general have recently been approved to an extent entirely unprecedented in the channels studied, in 1900 to 1905. He says that in magazine articles challenges to traditional sex attitudes developed a maximum between 1923 and 1928.

The contemporaneous presence of these two facts is not a mere coincidence. The brutality and the lawlessness released by war, after the war ended, were not held back in the family and in the social group. This same brutality and lawlessness directly stimulates organized forms of banditry in America today.

Substantially the same results were exhibited in the Central Powers after the war. Thus Exner, in his "War and Criminality in Austria," says:

"The forms and aspects of crime have also changed. They have become 'more martial.' The objects of stealing are conditioned by the hardship of war. The tricks of fraud are adapted to the habits of life and thoughts of the war period, but what is most critical, armed theft-and-assault has become

more numerous, gang-theft has increased. While aimless bodily injury, if I may put it thus, has stepped into the background, every form of violence and threat in conjunction with plundering and theft has become much more frequent."

He states that in Austria before the war there were 209.5 sentences for crime for every 100,000; after the war (1920), 568.6 sentences for crime for every 100,000.

Certain features of crimes committed by women lead Exner to speak of the "masculinization of feminine crime." He says the following crimes play a greater rôle among women than before the war: Murder, injury to body, dangerous threats, dangerous theft. Regarding the latter, "Women stole more during the war than men in normal times. This change in feminine crime is of the greatest importance for the criminologist, and it may also interest the psychologist to ascertain: That as woman had been called upon often to replace man in her social position, she approached noticeably his place also in her anti-social attitude."

He states that crime, both in regard to degree and form, had its most grave manifestations among young people.

The moral effect of the war Exner claims is incalculable. "But that this effect can only be an evil one, surely there is no doubt about that."

"The typical phenomena of our war criminality,"

Exner says, "are not so much an effect of the war in the sense of the course of armed warfare as an effect of the blockade, of the throttling of our national industry caused during the war by enemy armies and warships, during the post-war period by the depreciation of currency."

Exner compares the crime situation in Sweden, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, and the Canton Zürich, and finds that nations which suffered greatly under the economic warfare carried on in Europe exhibited a war criminality which is akin to that of the Central Powers, even if they did not participate in the war.

As to Germany, Liepman in a similar study says:

"What, however, gives the criminality of the war its most salient characteristic, is the fact that criminality seizes in a rising and overwhelming degree the hitherto intact portions of the population. That holds good not only for formal crimes and offenses against the industrial regulations of war, but with full sharpness, for the grave offenses, namely, criminality against property and the neglect of children closely connected with it. . . .

"The high point of war criminality for young people lies in the year 1918. In this year 99,493 young people were sentenced for crime and offense against the laws of the Reich, more than twice the number of 1914. In the first post-war year the crime sinks, which then again rises noticeably and continually from 1921 to 1923. 1923: 86,040 young people were sentenced. That is still one-seventh under the high point for 1918."

He also says: "Terrifying is . . . the gradual increase of murders committed by women toward the end of the war, and about three times as great a number in 1924" as in the previous years.

War is only part of the picture. Machine civilization, the automobile and the airplane, have facilitated crime and social disintegration. But the fact still remains that the great bulwark of the state not only against crime, but against social disintegration, consists in the maintenance of adult ethical patterns of behavior and the functioning of the family as a social educator. In war these ethical patterns are inevitably broken. The home cannot maintain its strength and purity when all that affection, ethics and intelligence have taught us, "the world says is not so."

Those who profit by war have said and always will say that war and post-war crime conditions have a merely temporal relationship. They will maintain that while one precedes, it does not cause the other. But here there is a complete sequence of cause and effect. Among the great world powers for four and a half years the acts which constitute the major crimes were the purpose of life. Students of social reaction everywhere observed the ethical and social disintegration of men in the field. These same students noted the outbreak of the same neurotic symptoms, the same lack of self-control in the civilian populations. The cruelty, the sadism of the post-war decade was revealed at home in the very pattern of

the army. Al Capone ruled his gangs as a commander-in-chief ruled his men.

If we were dealing with any other question, the coincidence of these significant facts would demonstrate the case. With reference to the war system, they demonstrate the case. Wars must cease because they put the world back centuries by abolishing the restraints, moral, social, ethical, built up in that fine but perishable process called civilization.

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CHAPTER VIII

BECAUSE WAR BREEDS WAR

DR. ALICE HAMILTON

"War is seldom in the interest of the people; justice is never secured by war; war breeds war; arbitration is the better way."

ERASMUS.

It is an old saying that war breeds war. There are even those who say that the real cause of the World War was the bitterness which resulted in France from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and although it may be that this was not a direct cause, it is certainly true that the memory of that conflict and of France's defeat in it profoundly influenced the makers of the Versailles Treaty and was responsible for the bitterness engendered in Germany by that Treaty. This bitterness has not subsided during the years that have elapsed since 1919. Indeed it seems more intense now than it was then, for those of us who saw Germany in the early days following her defeat and humiliation can testify that at that time her mood was not one of hatred and vengefulness, but one of desperation and bewilder-

ment. Fierce resentment came later and increased with the years.

It was in the Spring of 1919 that the Quakers asked Miss Addams and me to go with them into Germany and to make a report on the effect of the long food blockade and the measures of relief that would be needed. We found then that Herbert Hoover was the only person who could arrange for our entrance into that country and we went to see him in Paris. He told us he was anxious to have the Quakers undertake this task. "It is bad," he said, "for an individual to feel himself a pariah, it is a terrible thing for a whole nation to feel. Germany needs people of good will to show her that she is not an outcast among the nations." But the cold fact was that Germany in the eyes of her conquerors was an outcast and a criminal and all her subsequent history has been colored by that attitude on the part of the victorious countries.

When we reached Germany, immediately after the signing of the Peace Treaty at Weimar, we found dismay among most people, rather than resentment. For it seemed that the Germans had never realized what four years of hate propaganda had done to their adversaries. They had themselves had little of it (Germany's efforts at propaganda were expended outside, in countries which she hoped to draw to her side) and they had expected that, once the war was over, they would be accepted back into the association of nations. As we talked with Germans of all

classes, in cities small and large, even in a little mountain village, we came to understand their attitude toward the War. They had accepted it as an inescapable ordeal, the Fatherland attacked on all sides, Germans called on to defend her, but they did not blame Frenchmen, Englishmen, Russians for fighting them. War is war and soldiers have only to obey orders from above.

We who had lived through those years in a propaganda-ridden country could only wonder at this comparatively mild attitude toward the enemy, and I remember commenting on it to a gentleman of Huguenot descent who had always had many ties with France. He said that in a democracy, such as France, Britain, the United States, the war party cannot carry on without a sustained campaign of hate, while an autocracy has no such need, a docile people obeys orders unquestioningly. In the Allied democracies there is no such docility and therefore propaganda must be pushed to the limit, to arouse a hatred and ferocity without which the normal man cannot be driven to deeds of war. The campaign in England and in our own country was so brilliantly successful that it aroused Hitler's admiration and he tells us that the present Nazi methods are founded on ours. Goebbels is the product of Anglo-American war propaganda.

It was the failure to recognize this truth, that a democracy can be brought into a war only by whipping it up to fury against the enemy, which led so

many conscientious Americans to favor our entrance into the World War in order that we might be a moderating influence at the peace table. But when the Powers met around the peace table, the bitter hatred of Germany in their home countries, which those in authority had fostered, made just and moderate treatment impossible.

Therefore it was that the peace was dictated by hate and vengefulness, by men so blinded that they could not see the unwisdom of treating a strong and proud nation in ways which all enlightened people now reject for the treatment of wayward children and of criminals. The effect on the German national character was what any student of human nature might have predicted. If you subject an arrogant man to force and humiliation and what is to his mind injustice, you drive him into all sorts of defenses and compensations. He does not become reasonable and conciliatory, he grows more and more truculent, he is so obsessed with the injustice of some demands that he cannot recognize the justice of others, he has suffered from so many insults that he meets reasonable attitudes with arrogance. He acquires a settled sense of grievance and this clouds his view of the world and of himself, so that he cannot recognize any shortcomings on his own part. All his misfortunes and failures are due, not to his own incompetence but always to the malignancy of his enemies.

This psychology of the defeated is only too clearly

to be seen in present-day Germany. While other nations in this period of financial depression are searching in their own past for the causes of the disaster, Germans are attributing all their economic difficulties to the "*Diktat*" of Versailles. Go through the coal and iron region of Upper Silesia and note the idle mines and mills. Your German guides will tell you that production is terribly low and, if you remark that in your own country steel production has reached an even lower level and that the depression is world-wide, you will be told with some indignation that world depression has nothing to do with Germany's plight—it all comes from the miscarriage of justice in 1921 when the Poles won and Upper Silesia was split in two, with the larger share going to Poland. It is the same with all the other ills from which Germany has suffered, the inflation, the growth of Communism and the increasing unemployment and poverty since 1929. Hitler tells his countrymen that the victors brought all these disasters upon the Fatherland and they are only too ready to believe him.

When a man has been subjected to what he considers humiliating and unfair treatment and the protests he considers reasonable are disregarded and he has to submit to *force majeure*, he comforts his wounded self-esteem with dreams of revenge, of the day when he can strike back at his oppressor. Hitler has gained millions of followers by putting this dream into flaming words. Germans say that Hitler's

revolution means the bursting of the dam under the pressure of increasing resentment over the treatment Germany had received at the hands of her conquerors. Germans thrilled to Hitler's defiance, hurled at the world of enemies, and his repudiation of the policy of conciliation. He filled them with their old self-confidence, healed the wounds to their pride. And what wonder that his philosophy of force gained adherents! This is what thoughtful Germans who are not Nazis will say to you today:

"Why do you try to convince us Germans that force does not pay? We are where we are only because our enemies had more force than we in the War and we have seen a good deal of the success of force since the War ended. We have watched Poland take Vilna, Lithuania take Memelland, and the Japanese take Manchuria, without any real resistance on the part of other nations, and we say that, when it comes time for us to settle with Poland, nobody will really interfere, they will only protest."

And they will continue: "You forced a republican form of government on us. President Wilson would not even discuss an armistice until we had abolished the monarchy and formed a Republic which we Germans never wanted, and then you would not lift one finger to help that Republic get on its feet. On the contrary, you treated it so that inevitably the German people came to associate the Republic with national humiliation and defeat and to turn back to the old days of autocracy and of the Prussian army with longing. The Republic was doomed years ago, doomed by the very nations who had invented it. Hitlerism represents the revolt against a form of

government imposed from outside and degraded in the eyes of its own people by arrogance from outside."

As an American listens to such words he thinks of the American President who felt he was doing the best possible for the Germans by forcing them to accept the form of government he knew to be right, and then again thinks of another American President who said that no nation is good enough to rule another nation, and he wonders if Lincoln would not have said also that no nation is wise enough to impose its own ideas of government on another nation.

Go to the Castle in Koenigsberg and see the exhibit there of weapons of all periods and then watch the expression on the faces of your German friends and of the guard—a disabled soldier—when they show you the guns from the last war, every one of them rendered unusable by order from Versailles. It seems a small thing to Americans, a dozen mutilated muskets, museum pieces, but it was not too small for the attention of the treaty makers, nor is it small to the Germans, who smart afresh at each sight of this symbol of their shame. Hitler does not seem to them mad when he shouts: "How can we burn into the consciousness of every German a sense of this oppression and humiliation until in sixty million minds the common shame and common hate shall flow into a fiery sea of flame, in the heat of which will be forged a steely determination and a cry go forth, 'We will have our weapons back!'"

It cannot be denied that the worship of force has come back to Germany, that it is far stronger than before the War, that the voices of pacifists, internationalists, even of moderate liberals are silenced and only the doctrines of nationalistic arrogance can be heard. That Hitler's movement is based on exaggeration, often on lies, that it makes for the misery of the German people, not for its glory, may be true, nevertheless it has profound psychological bases. The failure to recognize German craving for self-esteem has resulted in bringing many Germans to the point of believing that the only way to regain a place of honor in the eyes of the world is by a display of military strength. Hitler says: "We must have the English and Italians as allies, but how shall we win them? Only by showing that Germany is again a strongly militarized nation, that we are desirable allies. In our present weakness lies the real ground for the solidarity of our enemies. . . . We may as well make up our minds that lost territories will never be regained by solemn appeals to Almighty God or pious faith in the League of Nations, but by the might of the sword alone."

It is this spirit, born of defeat in war, which lies behind the violence and ruthlessness of the Nazi régime. A tolerant German art critic, discussing the regimentation of art and literature which was so conspicuous immediately after the revolution, pointed this out. "One must remember that this is largely a revolution of the young hotheads who never fought

in the War but grew up under its shadow, in hunger, idleness, lawlessness, and the loss of all the old standards of German life. We who came back from the Front had much more chance to get work than they, for we had training and experience. Those of us who could find no place, ex-officers, for instance, are now with the Nazis, together with the post-War generation of young men who had no outlet for self-expression, no chance to feel themselves of some importance, no pride of country to compensate for the lack of personal pride. They have it now and it takes rather alarming forms, sometimes very ugly, bullying, cruel, especially when they are in a crowd, for alone they are often quite decent lads, but as a mob they will do anything. The leaders are, of course, men without background and conscious of it. The inferiority complex plays an enormous part in the psychology of the Third Reich. Arrogance, intolerance, brutality, are compensations for a drab, starved, hopeless childhood and youth."

We who are on the outside know that Germany's grievances against her victors are largely exaggerated at the present time, some of them quite groundless. We know that, as the years have passed, the victors' spirit of revenge has given way more and more to one of reasonableness and a willingness to face facts, that one by one the most grievous burdens laid on Germany by the Treaty were being lightened and that her present difficulties are part of the world-wide depression. But Nazi Germany would not and

will not believe it. Smarting from the memory of defeat, humiliation, injustice, she is determined to have revenge, to return violence for violence, to salve the wounds to her pride by striking terror to the world.

And so the seeds sown by war begin to reproduce their kind. For it was not an ideal which Christ expressed when he said, "Be not deceived. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." He was stating a fact of nature. You cannot gather grapes from thorns nor figs from thistles. Nor can you sow war and harvest peace. The seeds of war can only produce more wars.

CHAPTER IX

BECAUSE WARS INTERFERE WITH THE NORMAL GROWTH OF CIVILIZATION

JANE ADDAMS

"I think it is our duty to view war in terms of generations or centuries; to regard ourselves not as conceivers of the relatively petty interests of today and tomorrow, but as guardians of the ages to come."

GENERAL TASKER HOWARD BLISS.

EACH historic era insists upon making its own definition of civilization, sometimes reducing each definition to one word. Our own era has been designated as a technological civilization, one whose paramount interest has been the application of scientific research to the development of machines.

As we all know however, no one type of civilization has ever been complete, for there are always modifications and tendencies in other directions exhibiting what sociologists call resistances and compensations. Two of these which were developing normally and vigorously within our civilization were sharply cut into and all but destroyed by the World War. The first, which might be called non-coercion, was often contradictory and frequently cancelled

out its own processes, but nevertheless for two generations there has been a growing presumption unfavorable to mechanization and coercion. We see it in education, the cooperative relations between college professor and student in mutual research and other undertakings being in sharp contrast to the mediæval scholar who had to maintain his thesis in the midst of attack and hostile argument; we see it in the changed relations between the employer and his men implied by conference contrasted with the feudal relation which had for so long obtained in large industry. But perhaps the most striking change is that which is occurring in the law courts to lawyers who have for many years ranged themselves to prosecute and to defend the prisoner. There was almost a change in *mores* when the juvenile court was first established. The child was brought before the judge with no one to prosecute him, no one to defend him,—the judge and all concerned merely trying to find out what could be done on his behalf.

The element of conflict is still present in political parties and in international relationships. Perhaps owing to the fact that almost every modern state is founded upon a rebellion against the domination of a master group and owes its existence to success in arms, there grew up, in western races at least, the classic pattern of domination and conflict succeeding one another in almost rhythmic order, until the very institution of war became confused with pa-

triotism. Non-coercion therefore was slow to be tried between nations, although in the very last year of the nineteenth century an International Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, established at The Hague, was an attempt to apply non-coercion in this very difficult field.

We may take pride in the second "compensation" developed in our mechanistic civilization. The twentieth century has made such advance in the nurture and education of children that it is called the Century of the Child. Drastic reforms throughout the field of education have been reported at the huge conferences, national and international, held by progressive educators of our era. Perhaps one of the great achievements was the use of psychiatry in the care of the child, bringing to bear upon his growth and education the hidden compulsions and subconscious urges within himself. Such advanced educators stress the release of power which comes from the elimination of fear from the entire educational process. They know, for example, that great fear produces such physical changes in the vital organs of the body as can be photographed, and they count on a generation of children who shall be free from fear's inhibiting and disabling effects.

Yet war defeats all such progress, and perhaps the greatest outrage of the World War was that inflicted upon frightened children. We all heard of the nerve-shocked Belgian children who after they were safe in England were still sleepless and unstrung

night after night. Most serious in a social sense are the survivors nervously maimed by their war experiences. We hear how unable they are to concentrate their minds, how unbalanced and abnormal are the weedy grown-up boys who become excitement addicts, responsive to the most inflammatory appeals of passion and hate. More difficult to appraise is the perversion of ideas of normal boys and girls because their plastic childhood and youth were shaped by abnormal strains and stresses. We are all familiar with the reports of troops of abandoned children in Russia who wandered in an almost savage state over astonishing distances year after year, and the cases of the Near East Relief orphans who were a direct harvest of war.

With the exception of the International Organization of the Save-the-Children Fund, there has been no careful estimate of this loss. It is true that statistics in such a situation, impressive as they may be, are less poignant than are individual cases which, unhappily, are only too easily obtained:—the story told by a German woman of a school festival where a large class of children trooped to the stage and, as they lined up in formation, all through the hall men and women burst into tears to see what undernourished, pale, ill-grown little boys and girls these were;—or the story of the child described by a friend in Montenegro, a little creature who had been so starved of the elements necessary to bone growth that it walked on its hands and feet, its flabby

spine arching up in a hoop unable to give any support.

The individual cases that were burned into the memory of those of us who were in Europe immediately after the war were the cases of the lost children separated from all that was familiar to them, frightened and desperate. A Polish woman endeavoring to retrieve and care for such children found them scattered like leaves, a number of them wandering in the forest. One poor child with a baby on her back had been stumbling on for two days without food. The rescuer was shocked to find that the baby strapped by a shawl to the child's back was dead. The little burden-bearer could only assert that she had heard the baby cry out in the middle of the night; she spoke to it but did not dare unstrap it because she had to keep ready to run on at any moment she heard "the enemy" coming. The same Polish woman also told of a child she had heard crying in the thickets. It fled and hid like a frightened little animal and in spite of prolonged efforts she was never able to find it.

A report of the Friends Service Committee of which I was a member, who went into Germany immediately after the World War peace treaty was signed, makes the following quotation:

We met the men and women who are working against tuberculosis, to keep children healthy, to prevent crime and to foster education. What they are facing is the shipwreck of a nation. They real-

ize that if help does not come quickly and abundantly this generation in Germany is largely doomed to early death or a handicapped life.

It would have been impossible even then, in July 1919, to predict the shipwreck of national life; the familiarity with killing which seemed justified in a civilian government if it were made preferential by race, as killing in war had been made preferential by nationality; the fact that that war had fostered such contempt for human life that municipalities themselves had become indifferent to its protection, sapping the very foundations upon which even primitive governments were founded.

The previous chapters in this book give a stirring account of the increase of crime and violence as a result of war, but it is possible to trace similar changes in government itself when military courts were substituted for civil tribunals and when in one country after another drastic and savage punishments were revived. It may have been that the technological civilization of the West advanced too swiftly and heedlessly along the line of mechanical improvement, or that men unconsciously came to believe that all human problems could be solved by mechanical means so that in the end mechanized warfare came to be considered a valuable part of this process.

As a result of the World War both coercion and fear are reestablished in society as accepted methods of control. Such control has even been extended to

opinions and social convictions in the outworn pattern of mediævalism. It is found in neutral countries as well as in the so-called victorious and defeated nations.

Perhaps one of the most disastrous social results of the World War was the break-up of an international comity which had been growing throughout the world and the emergence of an exaggerated nationalism.

At the outbreak of the World War it was evident that the Victorian conceptions of internationalism were founded upon certain highly prized abstractions, whereas the young of the war generation had asked only for the understanding and fresh reaction to the intelligences of other hemispheres as the foundation for an internationalism which was the result of unobstructed intercourse of commodities and ideas throughout the world. They had already given up the comfortable belief of the nineteenth century that progress was automatic, and had agreed, on the whole, that as the problems of history occur and recur the only hope is that men of later generations may be better equipped to deal with them than the men living earlier had been. These young men do not wish the abatement of war in the settlement of their problems as they arise. A war decision is of no use to them, and they see all around them the backwash of the flood of emotions fostered in the great war still dealing with the most intricate problems without reason or understanding. They see

that international trade is being gradually strangled to death and that, if the process continues, millions of people in this economically interlocked world must inevitably die of starvation. They know quite well that only by international coöperation and restoration of the free flow of goods and credit can normal prosperity the world over be restored, and that is exactly what the post-war attitudes prevent.

On the whole, the post-war type of excessive nationalism—what Lord Cecil has recently described as “the nationalism that grew up in the nineteenth century to become an intense and dangerous force in the twentieth century,”—is one of the most dangerous results of the war. The nationalistic creed resulting from the war has been stated by an anthropologist at the University of Chicago as follows:

The argument, as stated by the active extremists, amounts to this: We are a superior race; our superiority is due to our civilization, and in order to preserve this civilization we must fight, contend, oppose and starve out the peoples who are weaker than we.

Such an exaggerated nationalism as has grown into a megalomania in Germany, and is found elsewhere in lesser degree, implying an absolutely uncritical opinion of one's own nationality, is inevitable when nation is arrayed against nation with the virtue of one constantly contrasted with the villainies of the

other, by every device of able propaganda. Because this post-war tendency has now been intensified by a world-wide depression, an exaggerated nationalism has become a serious factor in contemporary civilization. It has shattered the world market and keeps the world divided, poverty-stricken and fear-ridden. The desire of each nation to be independently prosperous at the expense of all others, is responsible for tariffs, administrative protection, quotas, export bounty, preferential treaties, and every conceivable form of interference with a world-wide economy.

We are constantly informed, even daily by the press, that man has learned to grow his food with one-tenth of the labor that was necessary before mechanized production was introduced, and statisticians further assure us that the world possesses in technical knowledge, in energy of men and machines, and in available raw material enough to give security and leisure to all those now living upon the planet. With such knowledge it has therefore become a deeper disgrace than ever before that men should be starving in the midst of plenty. We all resent the fact that just when applied science has come to man's aid in his long struggle for food and might enable him to throw off his unbearable fear of starvation, it is evident that science has conquered only the non-human part of his environment and that the relationships to his fellow men, upon which distribution depends, are still so ill-adjusted that dearth continues

and even increases. But the correction of such a state of affairs must come through international co-operation and can come in no other way. As the World War has destroyed the possibility of such action, we can justly hold the war responsible not only for the world-wide depression itself but for the lack of vigorous action on the part of mankind in dealing with it on international lines.

It needs only that men have faith in one another and in their common purposes to consummate this great task. But because faith in mankind and the resulting good will are exactly what war has always destroyed we must wait for the subsidence of the war psychology for the vigorous prosecution of this great task.

Happily, out of the World War itself have come international organizations to deal with such matters. The League of Nations, even to those who do not believe that the United States should enter it, must appear as the most important experiment in the direction of a new internationalism. The covenant of the League of Nations was framed at a moment when idealism ran high in Europe and men felt an obligation more imperative than ever before to abolish war, when ten million dead clamored within living hearts that they should have died in vain if war were not ended.

A great Kingdom of Peace lies close at hand, ready to come into being if we would but turn toward it. To make it real is the task of the men and women

who live upon the earth at this moment. May we not respond to the vigorous challenge issued by Romain Rolland in the midst of the World War:

Come, Friends, let us make a stand! Can we not resist this contagion—whatever its nature and virulence be—whether moral, epidemic, or cosmic force? Do we not fight against the plague and strive even to repair the disaster caused by the earthquake?

CHAPTER X IN CONCLUSION

DOROTHY CANFIELD FISHER

"War can be abolished, and in the lifetime of this generation. The common sense of that problem will appear to you when you reflect that while we have had wars from the beginning, we have had them because the world has always been organized for war. When the world—all of it—consents to organize for peace then we shall have peace."

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. O'RYAN.

THE women who have written the chapters in this symposium are of the hard-working kind who have no leisure; the hours they have spent on their contributions were either stolen from what should have been periods of rest, or were of the fatiguing high-pressure kind which turns out two-hour results from sixty minutes of time. Why did they—Mrs. Catt tells us that of those asked, not one refused—feel it worth while to contribute this considerable effort in order to set down once more the irrefutable proofs of the statement (which to anybody with a grain of sense is already an axiom) that war in the modern world is simply a one hundred percent mistake?

Because, as long as war is a possibility to modern

minds, these proofs must be tirelessly repeated and repeated in varying forms by different voices:—our State Highway Boards, taught by hard experience with heedless human nature, do not put up one sign admonishing automobile drivers to "keep to the right, center lane for passing only,"—but thousands.

And because it is an honor to any civilized being to be allowed to testify against war. It is a privilege to be given space in which to set down, all over again—but perhaps this time destined to be read by someone for the first time—the proofs that, whatever it may have been in more primitive ages, war in the modern world is suicidal mass mania, as unmistakably collective self-destructive insanity as is the maddened insistence of an individual lunatic on flinging himself out of a tenth-story window.

What inevitably comes into the mind of the person reading over the innumerable well-established perfectly intelligible facts and statistics cited in these chapters, proving that war can give nothing of the slightest value to any modern nation and lays waste most of what makes life worth living, is the astounded wonder, "But why then does war go on? What are the elements in this situation which elude this sort of analysis, slip like water between the fingers of logic, glide like oil around the unanswerable arguments of good sense and decent feeling, penetrate the granite of the instinct of self-preservation as if it were sleazy cloth—and in the end, prevail?"

Humanity is like a group shipwrecked in an open

boat slowly filling up with water:—we are in danger, we know it, we bail for dear life, our arms fly up and down with dippers, the muscles on our shoulders are tense with honest effort. But the boat which is our only hope of survival continues to ride dangerously low, the water lapping at the gunwales, and sinks lower from one hour to the next. How can this happen? We can see for ourselves that quantities of water are perpetually being removed by our dippers. Why is there perpetually more? Are there perhaps cracks in the floor of the boat that let in more than any dippers can bail out, cracks that must be mended if we are not all to drown?

After looking at the chapters in this symposium, any fair-minded reader feels it solidly established that as far as the dippers go they are not sieves, they have not a single hole in them. Nobody can doubt the soundness of the proofs set forth in this volume, of the idiotic, purposeless destructiveness—what one might call the murderous inanity of war. As completely as modern hygiene has proved that filth, disease germs, bad food and too much alcohol are harmful to human bodily health, these facts and figures prove that ordinary horse sense is revolted by the cosmic wastefulness of war, that common decency is horrified by it, that everyone of the higher qualities of our natures recoils from it. Why then does the damnable institution continue to threaten our lives, and everything that makes those lives worth living?

The chapters in this book have taken up one by one the reasons why wars must cease. What would the contents of a book be, that took up one by one the reasons why war has not already ceased? The first chapter and the longest one, would of course be a treatise on human stupidity, on the thick-witted human capacity to resist obvious proofs that a rooted tradition is false. Such a chapter would be full of arguments for more education as a means to enable brains to weigh evidence, resist sophistry, penetrate cant, tell the difference between propaganda and fact. Was there ever a more apt and more heartening analogy than Mrs. Roosevelt's between the still lingering belief in war and the now happily extinct belief in witchcraft; each one a poisonous fungus that can survive only in the dark of ignorance. The belief in witchcraft has proved itself to be a growth that cannot resist even the moderate degree of mental sunlight that is let in by universal literacy and the free public school. It is perfectly reasonable to hope that a higher degree of education, a more complete and successful disciplining of our intellectual powers, will do a great deal toward making war seem to our grandchildren the same sort of absurd hysteric delusion which we all now know the belief in witchcraft to have been. So I imagine the first chapter of an imaginary symposium on why war does persist in spite of unanswerable arguments against it, would end with the most stirring and eloquent appeal possible for more, better, more varied, more flexible,

more vital education for all the brains of every nation—as the first step to be taken against war.

But the book would not end there. Education is not the cure-all that our enthusiastic forefathers imagined it. Our brains are not the whole of us. Well-educated brains sometimes are but the tools whereby human greed enriches itself out of others' pain. The second chapter of our imaginary symposium would certainly take up the matter of profits made out of war by a predatory but powerful few in each nation. There would be plenty of material for such a chapter, with no need for original research. The evidence that the money to be made out of manufacturing munitions is one of the very deep (and until now, hidden) roots of war is piling up on the first pages of our newspapers in headlines so black and large that they cannot be missed even by the casual eye of the reader who always turns first to the sporting events page and then forgets to turn back to anything else. The writer of the chapter on profits made out of war, would be hard to keep within the bounds of his allotted pages. He would overflow in spite of himself, he would want to write the whole book, so copious, so plainly visible, so hellishly picturesque has his material become.

The third chapter might—if someone intelligent, powerful and clear-sighted enough to write it could be found—grasp firmly the nettle of “what is a defensive war?” and make some sense out of that riddle which ordinary people busy in earning their liv-

ings honestly could understand, and *not forget*, no, no matter how loudly the band played, no matter how capably the thimble-rigging theorists of military tactics shuttled the pea of defense back and forth until nobody knew where to find it. President Roosevelt is indicated as the writer of that chapter by the masterly—the word is intentional, *masterly*—simplicity of his suggestion a year ago that a defensive war is one in which a country's army and navy are within its own bounds. If they are on some other nation's land or water, the war is an offensive one. No one else in authority since the beginning of time has had the plain good sense and courage to show, as does that suggestion of the President's, that the much talked of “military complexity” of the difference between national offense and defense would probably turn out, if viewed with ordinary honesty, to be about as complex as the emperor's new clothes were stylish.

But these chapters would not by any means touch on all the reasons why war is still a hideous possibility, while a new witchcraft craze is as unlikely as a visit to the earth of the Man in the Moon. The next aspect of the matter to be taken up would be one often evaded and muffled by pacifists—the fact that war does give scope for certain fine older human virtues, qualities which are starved in what we euphemistically call our industrial “civilization”—such qualities as devoted comradeship, physical courage, physical endurance, dogged self-forgetting

determination to overcome impossible obstacles and difficulties, devotion to a cause that will not advance one's personal fortunes, joy in a victory that is not one's own but that of a cause deemed right. Human hearts are eager for an ideal to which they may wholly dedicate themselves. Ordinary existence is barren of such ideals. No matter how completely familiar are the irrefutable arguments proving that what looks like the sacred bread of patriotic war for one's Fatherland is but a very muddy stone, governments can always be sure that a certain proportion of their citizens will snatch at it with hope—with a little hope, at least—that this time it may be what it resembles, what they so sorely need, *a cause worth serving*.

When reminded of this element in the problem, anti-war writers usually point out that the opportunities in modern war for true comradeship, physical courage, devotion and so on are so meager and poor that they are not to be counted at all as against the frightful moral squalor of army life in war times, against the frightful disillusion always ground into decent human souls who are naïve enough to expect to find in war-conditions anything but unmitigated horror. Of course this is not—not literally—true, for men as they are in the mass. The various Associations of Veterans the world around may not be made up of sensitive idealists, but they are not brutes, either; they are a cross-section of masculine humanity, lacking the small proportion usually found in

miscellaneous human groups of a few very highly organized personalities. And one has only to watch a reunion of such veterans to see two things, that their longing for comradeship based on effort in common for a good cause is poignant, and that their memories of their war-experiences are not all nightmares. Their experiences as soldiers did actually bring to many of those ordinary men something not ignoble which they had found nowhere else in their ordinary industrial-age lives passed between office, factory, farm and home. When, in uniforms, they marched off gloriously under flying flags, between rows of excited men and women loudly praising and honoring them, keeping step to the music of a brass band so summoning to vitality that it would bring cripples to their feet out of their wheeled chairs, those plain private soldiers were under the impression that they were living through an hour more colorful, more stirring, more unforgettable than any other life had given them.

And they were right.

War-baters cry out, and truly, that for that one poor hour of imitation greatness, those private soldiers were to pay with years of misery and lowered vitality, with hideous dehumanizing memories, with shame, with drab hopelessness, far worse than anything they had known before.

And they are right.

But being right is not enough. We would do well to remember the by-gone days of shut-in, genteel,

and slate-pencil-eating young ladies, and take to heart the fact that as long as their elders did no more than cry out that slate-pencils are ruinous to health but did not change the daily diet and routine of the house-bound victims of the habit, slate-pencils continued to be nibbled. It was only after girls were given some outdoor air and freedom in their daily lives, and in their diet certain vital minerals that had been lacking, that they turned away to wholesome normal food from the perverse poor imitation of what they needed. The sober, heart-breaking fact is that in many cases those marching men really did have, in that brief experience of what felt like dedicated impersonal greatness, the closest contact with dedicated greatness of all their lives. Dumbly, far beneath the dutiful attention they give to the presentation of unanswerable arguments against war, their nerve-centers remember that one great throb of epic emotion.

What else can be the explanation of the disconcerting reception given by the general cinema public of a film recently shown to bring home the horrors of war to the visual imagination. The talented creator of the film trusted to the juxtaposition of ironically contrasting pictures, to carry his point;—showed for instance, alternately, the same private soldier, marching with his regiment between cheering crowds on a city street, and writhing in torment on barbed-wires in No-Man's Land between the fighting lines. The audience was respectfully, sym-

pathetically silent during the scenes of horror. But how they did climb on their seats and cheer when, to the music of fife and drum, the marching men carried by the old flag! And with reason, after all. There is something emotionally inspiring to the highest degree in the spectacle of a segment of our humanity, usually so pitifully, self-defeatingly quarrelsome, stepping off, invincibly *together*, to give themselves to a common cause. And apart from that, the physiological fact has long been evident that the crash of brass and the roll of drums are pleasurable stimulating to certain important human nerve-centers as physically and directly as pepper is pleasurable stimulating to certain nerves in our tongues and noses. Put the two together, loaded with our oldest associations of ideas, and what can happen but the to-be-expected? The question to ask, of course, is why use pepper but for one single dish—and that a poisonous one?

The chapter in our imaginary symposium to treat of this group of reasons why war persists in spite of everything, is one of the most important, and would need to be written by no other than Professor William James. Who else could be counted on to do justice to the theme? Who else could adequately develop his own luminous idea about the need for nobly constructive, sufficiently violent substitutes for war? And if anything could bring him out of his grave back to us who need him so, it would be this appeal.

But he might well have Dr. Watson as assistant.

If a baby can be conditioned to be afraid of a rabbit, and then reconditioned to love it, and then re-reconditioned to fear it again, certainly the conditioning of human nerves to flags and brass bands is not beyond control. Our experts know a great deal more than anyone used to about the formation of nerve-habits. Why not have them apply some of what they know in practical ways, that will be useful in this now desperate and last-ditch fight against the greatest menace to human life. Has anyone ever suggested that the distinctly peace-loving, distinctly war-detesting attitude of the Swiss people (brave enough in all conscience and full of the sap of bodily vitality) may come, to some extent, from their highly intelligent habit of hiring a brass band to accompany them when a group takes a walk in the country? Why—such peaceful family groups of ordinary men, women and young people seem to ask, swinging along *left! right! left! right!* their luncheon-baskets on their arms,—why leave all the good tunes to the Devil? Why allow murder to monopolize the good diaphragm-shaking blare of brass? There's no connection whatever between suicide and the satisfying throb of drums, why let anybody make you think there is!

But all this discussion of the reasons for the persistence of war, as far as we have mentioned them here, all the reasonable suggestions for overcoming them, would—if our imaginary book ended here—leave the matter where a similar matter would be

left if a committee of good citizens, trying to curb a neighbor given to dangerous whiskey sprees, had done no more than talk reasonably to him. For you will not have failed to note that every chapter (especially those of Mrs. Boeckel and Judge Allen) in the book of which this is the last one, shows, detail by detail, how exactly periodical wars are to nations what periodical alcohol-induced fits of mania are to individuals. The damage done to property and to human happiness, the listless, weary, discouraged morning-after inability to repair that damage, and—in Judge Allen's contribution—the dulling and inhibiting of human instincts and the freeing of brutal animal impulses which last on after the jag is over—wars reproduce on a collective scale,—all the various injuries done to individual lives by recurring attacks of delirium tremens.

Our committee of sober citizens would say to the man who indulges in periodical alcoholism, "See here, just consider, now when you are sobered up and like yourself, all the harm this habit does to you, and to your family. When you're crazy with whiskey, you break up the furniture, you endanger the health, even the lives of your wife and children, you're likely to burn the house down over your own head, you're a peril to everybody on the street, yourself included, you're likely to land in jail to stay. And what do you get out of it? A rotten taste in your mouth, long days of hard discouraging work trying to make up the damage you did in an hour,

broken nerves, no appetite for wholesome food, no digestion, a general misery of low spirits and sickness." (This is, in substance what people keep saying about war, isn't it?)

If you have had any experience with or made personal observations on men given to periodical sprees, you are under no illusions as to the results of this sort of reasonable exhortation. The object of this kind of talk would hang his head, probably he would not be able to bring up a single argument against those called to his attention, he might agree that his advisors were right in all that they said. But after so long a time—if nothing was done for him but to reason with him, if his life continued as it had been—when he once more began to have that deadly, gone, sinking feeling from which he had never been freed except by alcohol, all the logic in the world would be but a straw in the wind of his desperate need to escape—even by the ruinous, poor imitation of escape which was the only one he knew—from whatever it is that is unbearable in his life, ennui, emptiness, desolation, hopelessness, or perhaps some unendurably long-continued nerve-strain. Once good and drunk and crazy, he will have an hour or so during which, although in reality he is only breaking up his own furniture, fouling his own home, and preparing for himself the same old deathly nausea and nervous collapse, he has the illusion of heightened free bold living on a larger scale than the daily routine of washing his hands, sitting down to dinner

with the children and worrying about how to pay the rent.

Where could the editor of our imaginary symposium find a person wise enough, skilled enough in reading the blurred and mysterious pages of human psychology, resourceful and imaginative enough, tolerant, steadfast, deep-hearted enough to take into full account similar psychological reasons why war persists as a possibility in human minds, in spite of all our close-knit reasoned proofs that it is a life-element as loathsome as the habitual use of a repulsive drug like heroin. The author of that chapter—one of the most important because treating one of the less familiar aspects of the subject—would need to be able to understand, as well-washed, self-respecting, conventionally educated women find it hard to understand, the occasional nervous nostalgia for dirt and violence and irregularity and irresponsibility, which sweeps over humanity at times when the long road leading up to self-control and real civilization seems too steep, too stony to be endured. We are far enough away from the primitive life to have little racial memory of the sickening price it asks for the few low pleasures it offers us. In hours when we are weary with the price we must pay for our effort to be prompt, accurate, clean, self-controlled, self-directing and intelligent, a shimmering illusion hangs before our eyes, the illusion that we would really feel better if we gave it up and went back on all fours to frank animal savagery.

Such hours would do but small and passing damage to individual men if the money to be made out of manufacturing alcoholic drinks did not provide a profiteer to stand at every man's elbow, waiting to slip a whiskey-bottle into the hand that begins to grope vaguely for a change from drab everyday life. We would see few periodical drunks if, instead of whiskey, society provided for such hours in men's lives, according to their temperaments, an occasional dangerous piece of exploration, a plenitude of opportunity and stimulus for physical effort in the open air, an interesting difficult mental problem the solution of which would serve humanity, music or drama exhaustively absorbing to the emotions—or perhaps no more than a few days rest in sunshine, a few days vacation from heavy responsibilities.

Nor would such inevitable hours send men collectively into war, if the money to be made out of munitions did not provide paid-propaganda-created public opinion always ready to paste bright-colored labels on the bottles that contain the deadly stuff. The war-danger from such hours is that they increase the already dangerous submissiveness of human beings to strong suggestions from without, to the fatal tendency of men and women to do what is expected of them, to live up to other people's standards. What resistance to the shriek of war-talk has a man passing through this phase of numb dissatisfaction with what life seems to hold for him? Like the saloon, the recruiting sergeant's bullying persuasiveness

finds an easy mark in the big boy who is filled with secret dread that he may never have a chance to live at all.

Here is a reason, unacknowledged usually, why the conclusive arguments about the baseness and self-defeating foolishness of war do not at once outlaw it. Only a psychiatrist, and a wise one at that, could suggest ways in which the pinch of civilization's shoe could be eased on the human foot, and he would need an inspired economist to back him up by showing that it would be cheaper to ease that pinch in other ways than in war.

And finally what our psychiatrist and our economist, speaking together loudly in one voice, would cry out to the adequately fed, adequately sheltered and clad and protected people campaigning against war, is that in many cases that pinch comes not at all from the strain of enduring civilization, but from being shut out from the goods civilization has to give; from an enemy of mankind as old, as black as war—from poverty. They would point out that to intellectual men who have always been comfortable and reasonably sure of their future, army life may seem like an intolerable nightmare; but it may feel like a great step up in cleanliness, diet, clothing, variety, interest, safety (yes, safety!) and hope, to many an economically under-privileged brother man—be he "wage slave" or old-fashioned hired man, who knows himself shut out from tolerable life because he is defeated in the fight for money—the only

way into livable existence recognized by the modern world. How intolerable would an unemployed coal miner find barracks life? Or a sweatshop hand? Or a Negro just off the chain gang? Here is a crack in the floor of our boat that lets in more war-probability than our most cogent arguments about the dreadfulness of war can bail out.

That last chapter would enjoin upon us to recognize at its full value *as a defense against war*, a decent concern for the welfare of all in our society. The final impression it would leave on our minds would be the realization that poverty is not so much a moral crime, as a fatally stupid mistake. To invent more practicable provisions for occasional free wanderings, for escapes from monotonous narrow lives (until such lives can be eliminated altogether) to increase the kinds of creative activities open to all, to better the general physical health, to open doors to beauty, to fun, to aspiration, to comradeship, to variety—here are anti-war measures of the utmost urgency. A nation should call itself disgraced if it so orders life within its borders that there can be even one of its citizens, living so poorly, so unbeautifully, so hopelessly, that war—*war!*—can even for an hour seem a change for the better.